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About the Journal
Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal is a peer-reviewed, faculty-approved, student run
research publication that seeks to encourage undergraduate scholarship on diverse subjects. We
uphold publishing ethics and are committed to the integrity of academic research. This journal is
also specifically inclusive of historical narratives often overlooked in mainstream scholarship
and allows for the submission of interdisciplinary articles so long as the focus remains historical.

This journal uses Creative Commons licensing to allow the works published here to be accessible
to the most amount of people. Creative Commons is a form of public copyright licensing which
allows free distribution of a work with the requirement of citation. This means that anyone is
able to download and use a published work as a source or reference as long as the publication
and author is cited. This is the most common form of copyright for undergraduate journal
publications, and it allows for the widest distribution of scholarship.

Our review process is a double-blind peer-review by our trained group of student editors. After a
submission is approved, individual editors complete their reviews which they then bring to the
larger group of editors for approval. After the submission and edits are cleared by the staff and
the author, the article is sent to a senior faculty advisor who offers comments and suggestions.
Then, the final product is published to our site, and will be included in our cohesive publication
at the end of the academic year.
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Meet the Editors
Gwendolyn Rak (She/Her)
Editor-in-Chief
Gwendolyn is a junior from northern Virginia studying history and astrophysics. Combining the
two, she is particularly interested in the history of science, and would love to one day meet
Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins.
Daniel Pantini (He/Him)
Dan is a junior from Newport, Rhode Island pursuing an Honors major in History and an Honors
minor in Religion. On campus, he works for the Swarthmore History Department, was a Green
Advisor, and helps to organize events for the zero-waste collective SZW. During the online
semester, you can find him at aptly named Newport sites such as “Ocean Drive” and “Cliff
Walk.”

Ben Schaeffer (He/Him)
Ben is a junior from Lexington, Kentucky studying history at Swarthmore. Ben enjoys outdoor
activities such as hiking and fishing, and he loves dogs.

Vir Shetty (He/Him)
Vir is a junior from Haverford, PA, studying Physics and Statistics. In his free time, you can
often find him playing Crusader Kings II and insisting that the Fourth Crusade was the dumbest
war anyone started, ever.

Helen Tumolo (She/Her)
Helen is a junior from Staten Island, New York majoring in History and minoring in Educational
Studies. Beyond academics, Helen loves to read, knit, and crochet.

Ronald Wu (He/Him)
Ronald is a freshman from Vancouver, Canada studying political science and economics at
Swarthmore. Ronald enjoys music, travelling to the most random locations in the world (after the
pandemic), and finding the next best bubble tea shop in town.
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Letter from the Editor
While history is always unfolding, the months since our last issue have been momentous.
Elections, protests, and a global pandemic are among the events that defined 2020, and they
serve as a reminder of the importance of studying history. In particular, issues of discrimination
and systematic oppression have been recentered in the public discourse this year; we believe that
gaining a better, truer understanding of history is one step in addressing these topics, and SUHJ
is committed to advancing diverse and underrepresented histories.

In this issue of Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal, we present a wide range of articles,
spanning five continents and covering periods from antiquity to the twenty-first century. This
issue concludes with a selection from the senior thesis of September Sky Porras, SUHJ’s founder
and former Editor-in-Chief. Porras’s work was awarded Swarthmore College’s Paul H. Beik
Prize last May.

Finally, a special thank you to the Swarthmore History Department, especially Professor Diego
Armus, Professor Robert Weinberg, Jen Moore, and Maria Aghazarian.

Sincerely,

Gwendolyn Rak
Editor-in-Chief
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The Horseshoe Theory
of Mental Illness and Incarceration
Alicia Y. Liu
Swarthmore College

Introduction
“And I find it kind of funny, I find it kind of sad / The dreams in which I'm dying are the
best I've ever had,”1 Curt Smith sadly lilts in the chorus of the 1983 song “Mad World.”
Everyone seems to know the first lines of this 1980s hit, “All around me are familiar faces /
Worn out places, worn out faces,”2 but it seems that the chorus echoes far more than the first
lines. It echoes in the minds of the mentally ill, but probably much more in the minds of mentally
ill prisoners, who comprise 64.2% of those jailed and 56.2% of those in state prisons.3 The news
is full of information about a mental health crisis4 and an incarceration crisis,5 but what headlines
don’t often say is that these issues are overlapping. The three largest mental health treatment
facilities are Los Angeles County Jail, Rikers Island Jail Complex, and Cook County Jail.6 The
suicide rate of those imprisoned is three times higher than the national suicide rate.7
Political scientists first claimed the “horseshoe theory.” It argues that “the political
spectrum is bent, like a horseshoe, with the far right and far left at the ends bending around so

“Tears for Fears — Mad World Lyrics,” Genius Lyrics, Genius Media Group Inc., 14 November,
https://genius.com/Tears-for-fears-mad-world-lyrics
2
Ibid.
3
Van Wyck, Carolyn Pratt, and Elizabeth Pratt. "Mass Incarceration and Mental Illness: Addressing the Crisis." In
Incarceration and Race in Michigan: Grounding the National Debate in State Practice, edited by Scott Lynn Orilla
and Stokes Curtis, 177-212. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2020. Accessed October 31, 2020.
doi:10.14321/j.ctvq2vzv6.16.
4
Keya Vakil, “America’s Mental Health Crisis Is Exploding During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Courier
Newsroom, Courier Newsroom, 19 June 2020, https://couriernewsroom.com/2020/06/19/americas-mental-healthcrisis-is-exploding-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/.
5
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New
Press, 2010), 9
6
Van Wyck, 179.
7
Ibid, 183.
1
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they almost touch each other.”8 However, this theory is widely contested (see more in
footnotes).9 Despite its controversial nature, the overall shape of the horseshoe is useful in
analyzing modern imprisonment and past mental health treatment.
The United States’ historical treatment of mental illness and modern incarceration are
like the ends of a horseshoe—seemingly on opposite ends, but analogously close. The horseshoe
remains the best shape to describe this incredibly complex relationship, as it allows for a central
curve that connects the two, yet enough difference for a gap between the ends. Evidence for this
theory comes from the establishment of Friends Asylum in Pennsylvania, an examination of
asylum decrease and prison increase also in Pennsylvania, and a modern ethnographic account of
mental health treatment in a modern day maximum security prison in California.
I begin each section with a case study; something I believe encapsulates the topic at hand.
Then, I examine three parallels that almost connect the ends of present incarceration and past
mental health treatment. These parallels are: designed separation, long duration, and similar
reform histories. Next, I analyze the “middle” of the horseshoe, or a direct intersection of
incarceration and mental health treatment. Finally, I discuss why there is a gap between the ends
of the horseshoe or the crucial difference between present day incarceration and past mental
health care.
Separation: Selective and the Same
The first parallel is the selective separation that occurs in both prison and the asylum,
demonstrated by Morgan Hinchman’s experience. Friends Asylum was dubbed the “Quaker
Bastille” by Morgan Hinchman in 1847, after he sued his own family, friends, and the doctors of
Friends for involuntarily holding him there, just so they could take his money for “nefarious
purposes.”10 His family accused him of “moral insanity” due to stealing money from the bank he
worked at and physically hurting his mother in an orchard.11 To Hinchman’s lawyers, “moral
insanity” meant that he was “insane in conduct, not in ideas,”12 and the jury found for Hinchman,
which meant they thought he was sane.13 Hinchman, if in our times, would likely have ended up
in prison, not an asylum. He represents a particularly interesting intersection of wrongful conduct
Noah Berlatsky, “Let’s Put an End to ‘Horseshoe Theory’ Once and For All,” Pacific Standard, grist, 9 February
2018, https://psmag.com/social-justice/an-end-to-horseshoe-theory
9
Ibid; Simon Choat, “‘Horseshoe theory’ is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in common,” the
Conversation, The Conversation US, 12 May 2017, https://theconversation.com/horseshoe-theory-is-nonsense-thefar-right-and-far-left-have-little-incommon-77588.
10
Patricia D’Antonio, Founding Friends: Families, Staff, and Patients at Friends Asylum in Early Nineteenth
Century Philadelphia (Bethlehem, Lehigh University Press, 2006), 13.
11
“The Patient as a Psychiatric and Legal Subject in Nineteenth-Century America: BETWEEN NORM AND
NORMAL.” Diagnosing Madness: The Discursive Construction of the Psychiatric Patient, 1850-1920, by Cristina
Hanganu-Bresch and Carol Berkenkotter, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina, 2019, pp.
9–34. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv7r41gv.7. Accessed 31 Oct. 2020.
12
Ibid, 23.
13
Ibid, 25.
8

6

and whether or not that hinges on insanity. Fundamentally, Hinchman’s story is about separation
from society and the reasons behind it, making his case study an interesting introduction to the
formulated separation of people into asylums or into prisons.
First, both historical US mental health treatment and modern incarceration stem from a
desire to separate certain groups from the general population. In the early 1800s, Pennsylvania
Quakers created Friends Asylum for “unruly, unmanageable, and enfeebled kin.”14
Approximately 180 years later, armed with law-and-order rhetoric, Pennsylvania governor Dick
Thornburgh launched a campaign to build new prisons for criminals.15 Although for different
reasons, asylums and prisons reflect a deep social dilemma—how do we deal with members of
society that pose harm to themselves or others or are unable to coexist well with others? The
response to both those historically with mental illness and those presently convicted of crimes is
the same: it is better to separate them from the rest of society. Foucault likens the separation of
people into prisons to a village barricading itself from a plague, writing, “If it is true that the
leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion [...] then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects.”16 If
true, one must question why we view criminals and the mentally ill as “lepers,” capable of
spreading disease through mysterious and then unknowable ways. Foucault’s analysis strikes root
at our need for hierarchy and control. It is especially relevant when dealing with “deviant”
populations. Not only do the modern prison and the historical asylum separate people from the
general population, the method in which people are separated are eerily similar.
Secondly, the selective separation for both the asylum and prison are shockingly alike,
both with the intention of control. In Friends Asylum, the strength of mental illness dictated
where one lived and what conditions—those most mentally ill lived closest to the
superintendent.17 Likewise, in prisons, inmates are divided into sub-populations such as those in
mental wards, maximum security units, and those in the “general population.”18 Sometimes,
when some wards are better than others, moving blocks serves as a punishment, as seen by the
moving of Leroy Dewer and Ray Lamorie into the significantly worse HBZ block in the Attica
prison before the 1971 uprising.19 This careful format of separation serves to maintain power
imbalances: having “unruly” patients closer to authority puts them closer to control, while using
location as a punishment serves to deter prisoner misbehavior. Location allows for observation.
For those in Friends Asylum, being closer to the superintendent likely resulted in closer
observation, as they were nearer to authority, yet further from freedom. Foucault writes of
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon where “He [a prisoner] is seen, but he does not see; he is the
D’Antonio, 16.
Anne E. Parsons, From Asylum to Prison: Deinstitutionalization and the Rise of Mass Incarceration after
1945. (The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 137-138;
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York City: Vintage Books, 1995), pg. 198.
16
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York City: Vintage Books, 1995), pg. 198.
17
D’Antonio, 55.
18
Lorna A. Rhodes, Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison (London, The
University of California Press, 2004), 2.
19
Heather S. Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and its Legacy (New York,
Vintage Books, 2016), 47.
14
15
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object of information, never a subject in communication.”20 This Big Brother-esque watching is
for control. While Friends Asylum came before the panopticon, the patients there had constant
“companionship.”21 Those with more attention were and are supposed to be subdued more easily.
Therefore, how the patients/inmates were structured in asylums and prisons was almost identical,
yet what remains more similar is the physical location of asylums and prisons.
Some prisons are literally the same buildings as former asylums. States throughout the
United States “recycled” mental institutions and tuberculosis sanatoriums as prisons.22 There are
currently sixty-nine open or closed prisons on the grounds of former mental
hospitals/tuberculosis sanatoria. Understanding the economic situation of the asylum helps
explain this “recycling.” This was both a cost cutting measure and a measure to save the
economies of the small towns that housed the mental institutions. These small towns were
generally white and were hurt by the decline of industrial jobs, which resulted in extra labor and
little capital to create new jobs. They were among the staunchest advocates for more prisons.
However, research shows that the prisons could not save the economies of these towns, which
were suffering from the effect of industrial decay and massive job loss. In contrast, people were
staunchly against the creation of community mental health centers in their towns. Some wanted
to turn the former asylums into community mental health centers, but this failed for two reasons.
First, it did not fit Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh’s law and order agenda, and
NIMBYism (N ot I n M y B ack Y ard), the aforementioned opposition to mental health centers
spurred old asylums to become new prisons.23 To conclude, the first parallel between modern
prisons and historical asylums lies in the fact that they separate people, how they separate people,
and where they separate people.
The Constant and Continual Carceral State
Secondly, the constant and continual carceral states created by both historic mental health
treatment centers and imprisonment represents another similarity, as demonstrated by the 2003
Supreme Court case Lockyer v. Andrade. This case fundamentally asks, is $153.00 worth 50
years without parole?24 As a consequence of California’s “three strikes laws,” Leandro Andrade
will not be eligible for parole until he is 87 because he stole $153.00 worth of video tapes from
two Kmarts.25 A third felony, even nonviolent, will impose a harsh sentence ranging from 25
years to life. Since Andrade stole from two Kmarts, the judge sentenced him to two felonies,
which resulted in a sentence of 50 years until parole. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled his
punishment a violation of the Eighth Amendment, arguing that his punishment was “cruel and
20

Foucault, 200.
D’Antonio, 106.
22
Parsons, 143-144.
23
Ibid, 140.
24
Ina Jaffe, “Cases Show Disparity Of California's 3 Strikes Law,” npr, npr, 30 October 2009,
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114301025.
25
Jaffe.
21
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unusual.”26 However, the Supreme Court, ruling 5-4 on party lines (with the exception of Souter,
who, although appointed by a Republican, became a staunch liberal).27 Their reasoning was that,
since Andrade could receive parole after 50 years, it was not “cruel and unusual.”28 This case
study demonstrates the second parallel between modern prison and historical mental health
treatment: the torturous length.
The long time one spends, either as a convict or a patient, is a feature of both modern
prisons and historical asylums. The managers of Friends Asylum lamented that their asylum was
becoming a place for rich Quakers to leave their chronically insane relatives.29 Chronic patients
left fewer beds for patients who could be cured by moral treatment.30 Women at Laurelton, a
home for “feeble-minded women” in Pennsylvania, stayed for decades, generally past
menopause.31 This was to prevent these “feebleminded women” from passing their “feebleminded” genes to future generations. In fact, one of the main reasons why mental health care was
primarily so white (which prison is not) is that the people with “bad genes” were locked up, so
others could eugenically purify the white race.32 When voters repealed California’s three strikes
law in November 2012, over 1,500 people were released.33 Even without three strikes laws,
mandatory minimums create too long sentences disproportionate to the crime committed.34
Mandatory minimums spurred the growth of mass incarceration, leading to the prison crisis we
have today.35 Additionally, difficult parole measures such as needing a job before release, as was
in Attica in 1973, makes it nearly impossible to escape the clutches of a truly pernicious
system.36 However, even if getting out of prison or an asylum is challenging, staying out of these
institutions proves more difficult.
Both historical mental health treatment and modern criminal justice carry long,
sometimes lifetime, sentences because of recidivism. Recidivism supports the chronic nature of
these systems by making it nearly impossible to actually leave. Around ⅕ of Friends Asylum’s
admitted patients were readmissions from 1817-1841.37 Of this ⅕, half of them had experienced
mental distress within a year of release and thus returned.38 Prison recidivism is worse—a 2018
Bureau of Justice report outlines that 83% of those released were rearrested within 9 years, with

26

Jaffe.
“Lockyer v. Andrade.”
28
Jaffe.
29
D’Antonio, 34.
30
Ibid, 34.
31
Parsons, 50-51.
32
Ibid, 14.
33
Karch, Andrew, and Matthew Cravens. "Rapid Diffusion and Policy Reform: The Adoption and Modification of
Three Strikes Laws." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14, no. 4 (2014): 461-91. Accessed October 31, 2020.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24710977.
34
“Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform,” Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY FOUNDATION, Accessed 15 November, 2020. https://www.cjpf.org/mandatory-minimums.
35
Ibid.
36
Thompson, 12.
37
D’Antonio, 85.
38
Ibid, 85.
27
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44% being rearrested in the first year.39 It is difficult to leave, but it is even more difficult to stay
out. Therefore, both asylums and prisons have lengthy sentences due to recidivism.
Rational Reform
In an otherwise bleak essay, the similar histories of reform for both historical mental
health treatment and modern imprisonment provide possible hope and freedom as the third and
final parallel, as demonstrated by the 1971 case Dixon v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. This case concerned Farview State Hospital for the Criminally Insane in
Pennsylvania, where most people left by dying.40 He writes, “We find Section 404 to be almost
completely devoid of the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”41 Section
404 allows for involuntary commitments to be made by “a relative, guardian, friend, individual
standing in loco parentis to the person to be committed, or by the executive officer or an
authorized agent of a governmental or recognized nonprofit health or welfare organization or
agency or any responsible person.”42 This led to the release of hundreds, most of whom did not
commit crime or rejoin the mental health system.43 Although the case was focused on the
liberties of those institutionalized, public safety was of utmost importance.44 However successful
this reform was in freeing people from mental hospitals, it often sent former patients into a world
with little community support. Historian Anne Parsons writes, “On the one hand, many people
diagnosed with mental illness gained a host of negative writes, such as the freedom from
confinement. On the other hand, the more positive rights such as the right to mental health care
[...] did not materialize.”45 This hope, soon extinguished by the rough waves of reality, makes
this case and its consequences a reflection of both prison and asylum reform, as all began with
good intentions, but sustainability issues eclipsed any meaningful reform.
The last parallel is that reform for both the asylum and the prison came from genuine
altruism and high minded intent but failed due to financial reasons or unsustainable practices. In
the beginning of mental deinstitutionalization, mental health advocates had two unlikely allies:
the Pennsylvania Department of Justice (before the Department of Corrections was created,
corrections was under the Department of Justice) and prisoners’ rights advocates. Prior to the
law-and-order rhetoric, Pennsylvania, under Allyn Sielaff, the new commissioner of corrections,
used work and education release programs to reduce recidivism. Pennsylvania’s Attorney
General, William Sennett, preferred to use probation as a punishment, not jail time in this era.
Mariel Alper and Matthew R. Durose, “2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period
(2005-2014),” Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, May 2018,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf.
40
Parsons, 92.
41
“Dixon v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971),” Justia Law (Justia,
April 22, 1971), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/325/966/2594206/.
42
Ibid.
43
Parsons, 95.
44
Ibid, 94.
45
Parsons, 94-95.
39
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Prisoners went to “out-prisoner” programs, aptly named for its similarity to mental health “outpatient” programs. While in these programs, inmates went to forestry camps and work release
programs during the day and returned to prison at night. However, with fears of crimes stoked by
politicians after the Attica uprising and the rise of politicians like Governor Thornburgh, these
programs were later replaced with the building of new prisons, as “tough on crime,” became the
new political fashion.46 The visionary nature of the initial reforms under Sielaff and Sennett
proves that initial prison reform was high-minded and looked to the well-being of those the
system served. Likewise, mental health reform in Pennsylvania was similarly compassionate and
innovative.
At Friends Asylum, the reformers keenly focused on “moral treatment.” Moral treatment
was the idea that everyone, even mentally ill, had some semblance of rationality left, and that
individualized care and routines, consisting of work and being treated as a rational being, would
connect patients to their rational senses.47 This Quaker ethos of focusing on the “inner light” of
everyone sees its reflection in “moral treatment.” However, the collective need for security was
not fulfilled by moral treatment, which ultimately failed in providing a cure for patients and their
communities.48 Moral treatment disappeared after 1832, and after 1850, Friends Asylum was just
like other asylums, grounded in modern “medical” practice.49 Although it disappeared, the efforts
of Friends to connect to the “rationality” of the insane represents a valiant effort, like the
community corrections under Sielaff and Sennett, for high minded reform.
Fundamentally, Sielaff and Sennett’s reforms became politically inconvenient, while
there were sustainability issues with Quaker mental health reform. In 1970s Pennsylvania,
legislators shifted to the American zeitgeist of “tough on crime.”50 Criminal justice became
punitive, not rehabilitative.51 This made community corrections against the agenda of people like
Governor Dick Thornburgh, who built new prisons while slashing budgets for community mental
health programs.52 Similarly, having personal attendants at Friends Asylum became
inconvenient. Moral treatment failed in part due to the highly individualized nature of the
practice. Patients needed constant personal companions to do work with them, which proved
costly and taxing to employees, who had other duties.53 Therefore, the final parallel between
historical mental health treatment and present criminal justice treatment lies in the failed highminded and compassionate reform that reformers attempted.

46

Parsons, 100.
D’Antonio, 18.
48
Ibid, 147.
49
Ibid, 29.
50
Parsons, 100.
51
Ibid, 100.
52
Ibid, 129.
53
D’Antonio, 106.
47
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The Miserable Middle
After examining the three parallels of modern incarceration and past asylums, I will now
introduce the “miserable middle,” where mental health “treatment” and imprisonment collide in
the curve of our horseshoe. Eddie Mullen, described as “a small disheveled man with several
tattoos and scars,” was in prison for attacking his family members while drunk.54 When he met
with the admitting mental health clinician, he described paranoia, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, and
remorse over his actions. His intention? To be admitted in a mental health ward because “he did
not want to be sent to a more threatening environment.”55 The clinician he spoke to thought
either antisocial or borderline personality disorder was the proper diagnosis for Mullen. The
difference between these two diagnoses would mean much to where Mullen would be placed.
Clinicians view antisocial personality disorder as incurable, while a diagnosis of schizophrenia is
viewed as treatable.56 Foucault writes that psychiatry provides people who are deciding
“deviancy” a veneer of “scientificity,” which is supported by the law.57 Much of his argument
lies in the power imbalance between the psychiatrist and the patient, and nowhere is this more
present than in prison. This difficult delineation of mental health problems while still balancing
the safety of other prisoners represents the tension underlying “the miserable middle:” where
mental health treatment and prison intersect. This section will discuss the overlapping
populations served by the two systems and life in a modern mental health ward.
The modern prison population is overwhelmingly male,58 and Friends Asylum was also
disproportionately male.59 Moreover, as mental hospitals closed, people who would have been
institutionalized in hospitals were instead incarcerated in prisons.60 A year after the passing of
California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act in 1970, the amount of mentally ill people in the
criminal justice system doubled. This act made it more difficult to involuntarily hospitalize
people, but researchers discovered that police officers would just arrest people, if they could not
commit them due to mental health reasons. After the deinstitutionalization of asylums in the
1960s, police began arresting mentally ill people (who previously had lower arrest rates than the
general population) at higher rates than the general population.61 The aforementioned statistics in
the introduction egregiously indicate that this issue has just skyrocketed with more and more
mentally ill people in the prison system than ever before. Furthermore, these overlapping
populations coincide in the mental health wards of prisons.
What is this “miserable middle” like? In some aspects, it is exactly the same. They
undergo the same regime of surveillance and control, and the punishment system for infractions

54

Rhodes, 140.
Ibid, 141.
56
Ibid, 141.
57
Foucault, 296.
58
“BOP Statistics: Inmate Gender,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, USA.gov, 24 October 2020,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_gender.jsp.
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D’Antonio, 73.
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remains the same.62 However, there is a reason why some prisoners, especially those in isolation,
want to be in mental wards. It is because of the human interaction one receives in a mental ward.
There are prisoner painted murals, therapists, and medication treatment. Rhodes writes, “Thus
what distinguishes mental health from other units—before any consideration of “treatment”—is
the interpretation placed on inmates’ “need for attention.”63 Workers perceive inmates as needing
attention, not just wanting it, and the inmates therefore receive it. However, this attention may be
for naught—a worker described his situation as a “cesspool” and that “we’re not going to get
healing.”64 Do not expect a “cure” for these mentally ill, expect a maintenance of symptoms at
best. Incarceration simply will “cause harm through either neglect or attention.”65 Therefore, the
“miserable middle” is similar to general incarceration in some ways but different in others.
It is difficult to paint in broad strokes about mental health wards throughout the United
States, which vary wildly due to funding and other factors such as how the state generally treats
inmates. In New Jersey, former inmate now college student Sabir Bell, describes a situation
significantly bleaker than in Rhodes’s ethnography. He describes stigma about going to mental
health wards, which contributes to many mentally ill prisoners avoiding “help.”66 Part of this
stigma is likely due to the negative impact a mental health diagnosis has for parole. Medical
practitioners distribute medication, but mainly to sedate, not to cure, since they view the inmates
as prisoners first, then patients, putting punishment before rehabilitation.67 Therefore, the
“miserable middle” varies greatly from state to state, but the curved intersection between mental
health treatment and incarceration is terrible wherever you go.
The Choice Chasm
Now we will study the sliver of space between the ends of our horseshoe. It can be
summarized succinctly in one word: choice. Jeremy Roland, due to the three strikes law, is
serving a life sentence for three felonies.68 Rhodes writes, “He [Roland] mourns the rational actor
he could have been and wants to be now.”69 What is this “rational actor”? From economics to
criminal justice, the elusive “rational man” remains at the forefront of how we view the way
people act, or at least the way they should. What separates Roland from any inmate at an asylum
is that he made a choice to commit crime. The world perceives him as having control over his
life, and therefore, should be held accountable when he makes mistakes. Roland himself does not
disagree but does think his punishment is excessive.70 Roland captures precisely the miniscule
gap between the asylum and the prison: the ability to choose.
62

Rhodes, 116.
Ibid, 121.
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Ibid, 119
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Ibid, 119.
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Sabir Bell. Interview by author. Hillsborough, New Jersey (Zoom). December 11, 2020.
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Ibid.
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Ibid, 4.
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The ability to choose is what separates the asylum from the prison. People perceive
prisoners as, correctly or incorrectly, having chosen to commit crime, and therefore should
receive punishment. However, people do not choose to be mentally ill, and therefore should
receive treatment. Supporting this idea is the idea of the rational man. In Friends Asylum’s moral
treatment, patients lost their rationality, but people could still appeal to it and bring it back.71 In
prison, people assume that “rational man” is there and should act accordingly.72 For example,
staff believe that by punishing missteps, the prisoner will connect his behavior to the punishment
and later cease, to avoid punishment.73 However, how much choice is there in a prison
environment where your showers, your meals, your job, your information, is dictated by
bureaucracy? There is a limit to the “rational man.” Therefore, what forms the gap between the
ends of our horseshoe is the perceived power to choose.
Conclusion
The horseshoe theory, although first used by political scientists, serves as a rich symbol of
the complex relationship between historical mental health treatment and modern incarceration.
Three forces push the ends (asylums and prison) together: the intentional and systematic
separation of people from society, its enduring duration, and histories of high-minded reforms
that eventually imploded. The “miserable middle” (the center of the curve) of the horseshoe
consists of populations that overlap and mental health wards in prisons. Lastly, what separates
the ends of the horseshoe is the concept of choice.
The constancy of a carceral state permeates US history and society. The question is not
just if or what the next carceral state will be, but rather why? What does it say about our power
relations that we separate people? What should the purpose of separation be, to help the one
isolated or to protect ourselves? These questions have dogged thinkers and reformers and are by
no means solved now; the challenge now is to understand and implement the efforts that must
tiptoe a careful tightrope. If we are too punitive and desirous to protect society from “dangerous”
people, we may extinguish all effort of redemption and make it impossible for those who have
made mistakes or are ill from returning. Historically, society has sacrificed the rights of many to
protect the collective, and it is not entirely wrong to let go of some freedoms to protect the
public: wearing a mask during a pandemic, vaccine mandates, etc. The impossible question is
how much?

D’Antonio, 134-135.
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Mob Ideology or Democracy:
Analyzing Taiping Rebellion’s Defeat and Revolution of
1911’s Triumph in Ending the Qing Dynasty

Bincheng Mao
New York University

1. Introduction
The Collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 marked one of the most consequential
geopolitical changes in the contemporary history of East Asia, and historians often connect this
dynasty’s crumbling to both the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s as well as the Xinhai Revolution
in 1911. The ferocious Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement was undoubtedly a significant
event in modern Chinese history. Led by Hong Xiuquan, this armed rebellion persisted for over
14 years, covering 18 provinces; yet the Qing Dynasty lived on. On the contrary, the Xinhai
Revolution of 1911, within four months and fifteen days, achieved the objective that Hong
Xiuquan could not attain in fourteen years: overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. Therefore, it is
particularly meaningful to investigate a core question: why did the Qing Dynasty survive the
Taiping Rebellion yet crumbled upon the Revolution of 1911? In this paper, the author argues
that the Qing dynasty survived the Taiping Rebellion yet crumbled upon the Xinhai Revolution
because the latter’s core ideology, Three Principles of the People, drew support from within the
Qing regional governments by creating the prospect of maintaining power for Qing officials,
while the Taiping Rebellion’s mob ideology achieved the contrary; in addition, the Revolution of
1911 faced a weakened imperial dynasty due to its internal conflicts over constitutional reforms,
successfully prevented foreign powers from aiding the imperial dynasty — two conditions absent
for the Taiping Rebellion.
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2. Differences in Ideologies Between the Taiping Rebellion and the Revolution of 1911
2.1 Taiping Rebellion’s Counterproductive Mob Ideology
Even though members of the Taiping Rebellion claimed to be champions of “God,” it
was, in fact, a facade used to conceal the reality that they were merely driven by a self-serving
mob ideology; it was this very ideology that doomed the rebellion to ruin as it cut off its hope to
break the Qing dynasty from the inside. According to Chinese Among Others: Emigration in
Modern Times by historian Philip A. Kuhn, from 1753 to 1832, China experienced a period of
rapid population growth, leading to “a 43% decrease of cultivated area per capita.”1 In other
words, every Chinese farmer lost nearly 8 acres of arable land, causing a substantial increase in
famines throughout China, especially in the South where the population boomed. This was the
condition that the ordinary Chinese people were in.
Taking advantage of the situation of famine and poverty, Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the
Taiping Rebellion, offered the people a religion whose creeds included “people who believe in
other religions give joy up to ask for pain,” and “faithful followers shall receive all food as
presents from the ‘God Emperor,’” whom Hung claimed to be his father in his publication
Instructions on the Original Way to Save the World.2 Those farmers and workers who had long
suffered from food shortages under the Qing dynasty’s rule had no idea who this “God Emperor”
was but were quite interested in acquiring food and pleasure. Therefore, more and more people,
who had only been exposed to Chinese folk religions previously, joined the Taiping Army not
because of their devout religious faith in Hung’s newly formed God Worshipping Society but to
acquire food and other resources they desperately needed, hence their mob ideology.
The mob ideology of the Taiping Rebellion resulted in their looter-like characteristics:
when the Taiping Army occupied a city, the surrendered, including both Qing officers and
civilians, would be slaid by mod-like Taiping soldiers and their property would be taken away.
For instance, according to What Happened in Nanking in 1853 by Shen Juanxi, a survivor of the
Taiping Army’s massacre after the 1853 battle of Nanking, following Taiping’s capture of the
historic city, “there were civilians’ bodies all over the streets while soldiers forced yet-to bekilled local people to hand in their wealth by putting machetes on their necks.”3 Massacres that
resemble horror in Nanking in 1853 repeatedly occurred during the Taiping Rebellion yet the
leadership never sought to stop them, proving that both the lower and upper-level members of
the rebellion prioritized satisfying themselves rather than to establish a “heavenly kingdom”
under Hung’s religious teachings.
In addition, this mob ideology led to the ultimate failure of the Taiping Rebellion because
it unintentionally united Qing regional officers against a common enemy in order to preserve
their lives and property. In other words, this mob ideology made it impossible for senior Qing
officials, who possessed enormous fortune, to join the rebellion, causing the slow expansion of
1
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the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and earning time for the mobilization of Qing dynasty forces.
For example, Bao Lishen, a member of the gentry in Bao Town of Zhejiang Province, led his
men to fight against the Taiping Army invasion for nearly a year, “killing more than thirteen
thousand Taiping soldiers and holding no fewer than ten thousand of them as captives” according
to the research paper “Conflicts Between the Taiping Army and Local Forces” by Dr. Liu Chen. 4
While the battles in Bao Town inflicted heavy losses on the Taiping forces, the Qing dynasty’s
Viceroy of Lianxiang, Zeng Guofan, also realized that the Taiping Army, characterized by its
mob ideology, is life-threatening to him. As recorded in William Rowe’s China’s Last Empire:
the Great Ching, Zeng organized the Xiang Army from “existing regional militia forces to
suppress the Taiping Rebellion.”5 By 1859, Zeng Guofan’s army, aided by gentry like Bao
Lishen, recovered much of Zhejiang province from the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, displaying
the unintended consequence of Taiping’s mob-like mentality of consolidating Qing’s regional
forces.

2.2 Revolution of 1911: The San-min Doctrine (Three Principles of the People) That Broke
Down the Qing Dynasty
Unlike the Taiping Rebellion, the Revolution of 1911 possessed a clear and rational
guiding ideology, the San-min Doctrine, also known as the Three Principles of the People; this
was this very ideology that incited the defection of multiple Qing regional officials by giving
them hopes of preserving and even expanding their powers, therefore resulting a dramatic shift in
power between the imperial and revolutionary forces.
The Revolution of 1911 was led by the Chinese United League, or Tongmenghui, a
merger of multiple revolutionary societies in the late Qing dynasty. The league, headed by Sun
Yat-sen, held a central faith, the San-min Doctrine, an ideology consisting of three aspects:
nationalism (Mínzú), people’s power (Mínquán), and people’s livelihood (Mínshēng). The
founder, Sun Yat-sen, constructed these three principles based on US President Abraham
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, “a government of the people” corresponds to “Minzu”, “a
government by the people” corresponds to “Mínquán,” and “a government for the people”
corresponds to “Mínshēng.”6 After the formation of this ideology, Sun Yat-sen spared no effort
to promote it. According to Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning published by Stanford
University Press, Sun “announced all three principles in the spring of 1905” and then gave
speeches about “‘San-min Doctrine’ in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.”7 Upon the establishment of
Tongmenghui, Sun published multiple editorials in domestic newspapers, such as Min Bo, to
advocate for the three principles throughout China.
4
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In the case of the Revolution of 1911 specifically, the second principle of the San-min
Doctrine, Mínquán, was the deciding factor in the revolution’s success. According to The Three
Principles of the People written by Sun Yat-sen, the principle of Mínquán, literally “people’s
power,” is divided into two parts: “the power of politics and the power of governance.”8 The
“power of politics” is the citizens’ power to express their political will through four methods:
“election, recall, initiative, and referendum.”9 When merely considering this first set of power, it
may even seem counter-productive to gain support from Qing officials since measures, such as
recall and election, would put limits on their power. However, when factoring in the second set
of power, “the power of governance,” the boost that this ideology brought to the revolution
becomes much more intelligible. The “power of governance,” as Sun Yat-sen puts it, is the
“power of administration.”10 It allows officials to make policies in order to govern the very
people who are supposed to be their source of power. On top of this, without laws or rules that
limit regional officials’ power at the moment, they were virtually free to maintain their ruling
status by regulating commerce and the media to control the public, canceling out the checks
established in the “power of politics.” Moreover, according to Electoral History of the Republic
of China, the 1911 Provisional Presidential Election set up by the revolutionists was not a
general election but an indirect one in which “Sun Yat-sen was elected president by
representatives of governors from seventeen provinces.”11 And according to the roster of
governors, Cheng of Jiangsu Province, Zhu of Shandong Province, Zhang of Guangxi and
Guangdong Province and three others were all governors of their respective provinces in the
Qing dynasty and joined the revolutionists in 1911.12 Their preservation of the governorship
proves the probabilities for Qing regional officials to preserve their political powers under the
new government. The fact that the San-min Doctrine grants officials the power to govern and the
government guided by such ideology allowed former Qing officials to preserve powers rather
than ousting all of them are evidence of how the Revolution of 1911 greatly differs from the
Taiping Rebellion half a century ago.
3. The Impact of Foreign Intervention on the Outcomes of the Taiping Rebellion and the
Revolution of 1911
3.1 Foreign Aid to the Qing Dynasty that Doomed the Taiping Rebellion
Other than their ideological differences, the intervention of foreign powers favoring the
Qing dynasty was also a core factor that determined the failure of the Taiping Rebellion. During
the initial stage of the revolt, foreign powers were interested in this self-proclaimed Christian-led
rebellion in China because of its potential to convert over 400 million Chinese into Christians.
8
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Soon after the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom established its capital in Nanking 1853, many western
powers sent their plenipotentiaries to visit Hung, the heavenly king, including Sir. George
Bonham, the British Minister Counselor to China in 1848-1854. According to The Chinese and
Their Rebellions by Thomas Taylor Meadows, the assistant of Bonham, the minister counselor
was shamed by the arrogant ruler of the Heavenly Kingdom. The Englishman not only found that
Hung asked “England to be a client state of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,” but also that the
Taiping leadership lived extravagant and dissipated lives, often the exact opposite to his
Christian ideals.13 Upon Sir. Bonham’s return to London, he casted serious doubts on the
Christian nature of the Taiping Rebellion and its capability to replace the Qing dynasty as
China’s ruling authority, suggesting London and other European powers not to support the
Taiping regime.14
The beauty of historical research is to discover previously ignored relationships between
critical events in history, and the fact that England did not support the Taiping Army in its earlyto-mid stages, while it still prevailed, also had such a fascinating connection. On October 16th of
the same year that the Taiping Army achieved its grand victory in Nanking, the Crimean War
broke out in Europe. Over two hundred and fifty thousand British troops participated in the
battles, resulting in appropriately seventeen thousand casualties. This massive loss in Crimea
further reduced the British government’s will to intervene in a lengthy Chinese civil war, hence
Britain’s, the most powerful imperial country at the time, neutral stance before 1860.
However, in 1869, the Taiping Army made a move on Shanghai, center of the textile
industry in China, after destroying most of the agricultural industries in the deep South,
threatening the production of crucial commodities for the UK, such as tea and silk. Accordingly,
London had to choose one between the Qing dynasty and the Taiping Rebellion to assist it in
winning the civil war. Days before its planned siege of Shanghai, Taiping announced that it
would ban the trade of opium, alcohol, and tobacco from foreign countries, hoping to gain
popular support in Shanghai. Yet, this plan backfired. Following the Taiping regime’s ban on
opium business, Britain’s primary source of profits in China, London considered the Qing
dynasty to be the better facilitator of British interests. Then, in June of 1860, the UK government
implemented restrictions on all arms sales to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom according to The
History of the Taiping Rebellion, while allowing British merchants to sell rifles and canons to the
Qing Army. Since then, the Taiping Army could only obtain western weapons by smuggling,
which was obviously much more costly and time-consuming.15 Foreigners in Shanghai, aided by
their respective nations, also formed their own militia to resist the Taiping invasion.16 According
to Henry Andres Burgevine, the co-commander of the “Ever-Victorious Army,” a unit of foreign
13
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mercenaries working on behalf of the Qing dynasty to protect Shanghai, representatives of the
Qing Army could buy a rifle for 15 to 20 silver dollars, a price much lower than usual while the
sales to the Taiping Army was strictly prohibited.17 This meant that however much that the
Taiping Army was willing to pay for western weapons, it was next to impossible for them to
acquire them from the closest source of weapons in China.

3.2 Limited Foreign Intervention during the Revolution of 1911
If the Qing dynasty successfully suppressed the Taiping Rebellion with the assistance of
foreign powers such as Britain, why did not the same outcome reappear in 1911? Primarily, the
leader of revolutionists, Sun Yat-sen learned the lessons from the Taiping Rebellion’s defeat and
took a much more practical approach towards foreign interests in China. Sun never explicitly
declared that the revolutionary government would withdraw from all unequal treaties with
imperial powers or suspend foreign special interests in China. The revolutionist hoped to prevent
foreign intervention and to acquire recognition from the international community. Therefore, a
replacement of the Qing dynasty with the revolutionary republic hardly affects the interests of
foreign powers in China.
In addition, foreign intervention existed during the time of the Revolution of 1911 but not
during the Taiping Rebellion: the constraint of each other among great powers. During the
historical period of the Taiping Rebellion, there were only two great foreign powers, Britain and
France, that were capable of influencing the outcome of a Chinese civil war. Nevertheless, the
distribution of power among nations altered dramatically half a century later in 1911: the power
of the United States and Russia rose, and Germany and Japan also joined the world arena。
These powerful countries had sharp conflicts of interests among themselves — 1911 was only
three years before the first World War. According to The Origin Of Rebellions by Professor
Xiang Lanxin, diplomats deployed by those powerful nations to China were not dealing with the
affairs of China but rather the affairs of other powerful nations in China.18 The only thing these
imperial states had in common was that they would never allow another to expand its interests in
China alone. For example, in October 17th of 1911, Saidou Makoto, then Japanese naval
minister, ordered the third fleet of Japan to block the Yangtze River in order to intervene in the
Chinese Civil War of 1911, but London warned Tokyo not to take any action in China alone,
forcing Japan to halt.19 Under this circumstance, The U.S., supported by France and Germany,
proposed that all foreign powers may only take actions together in China, and the proposal was
agreed by other countries soon on a meeting held in Washington D.C, forming “the principle of
collective action.”20 Therefore, as illustrated above, the complex situation in China in 1911 is
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also an important reason that all those countries hold their neutral position steadily, allowing the
Xinhai revolution to ultimately overturn the Qing dynasty.
4. Different Circumstances that the Qing Government Was Under Between 1850s to 1910s
4.1 Taiping Rebellion and a Qing Government Without Significant Internal Conflicts
Prior to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, a newly emerged class of national
capitalists sought to expand their power by pushing for a transition of governing systems from an
absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, dividing the Qing leadership. And this division
only occurred after the Taiping Rebellion as the rebellion is part of the reason that the Qing
dynasty realized its need for a westernization movement which led to the rise of national
capitalists and then their struggles towards constitutional reform.
The emergence of constitutionalists originated in the rise of capitalists as a result of the
Self-Strengthening Movement beginning in the 1860s. Half a century before the Revolution of
1911, the Qing dynasty experienced the Taiping Rebellion, which it ultimately defeated with the
help of foreign aid, and the Second Opium War, in which two western powers overwhelmed the
Chinese imperial forces. After these two upheavals, the senior-level officials of the Qing dynasty
acknowledged the superiority of western technologies yet were reluctant in recognizing the need
for political reforms. In 1864, then-governor of Jiangsu Province, Li Hongzhang submitted a
report to the Qing government, claiming that “the grand Chinese civil and military systems are
significantly more advanced than those of the west, it is merely Chinese firearms that lags far
behind.”21 Li later became one of the chief architects of the Self-Strengthening Movement and
the aforementioned therefore became the manifestation of the movement’s goal: to westernize
the Qing dynasty’s technological industry. During this time, the Qing government established the
Jianan and Tianjin Arsenals, the Fuzhou Naval Yard, the Jiangnan Manufacturing
Administration, etc. all of them are state-owned westernized industries.22 Therefore, a new class
of national capitalists had not fully emerged in China due to the state-led nature of westernized
industries.
However, this situation changed completely in 1894. The Qing Dynasty’s most
westernized and most trusted naval fleet was devastated in the First Sino-Japanese War. The
pride of the imperial governing system rooted in traditional Sinocentrism shattered as the Qing
dynasty, fully equipped with westernized technologies, lost to a none-western power, Japan.
Since then, Qing began to open up its western industry to nationals and private companies, led by
a class of capitalists, emerged. On top of this, the nation that defeated the Qing dynasty also had
a westernization movement, the Meiji Restoration, where it not only westernized its technologies
but also its governing system. By this point, the Qing government loosened its control on
industries, allowing more individuals to participate. For example, in 1901, under the invitation of
21
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the governor of Jiangsu Province, Zhang Jian, a private industrialist established modernized
textile mills, oil plants, power plants, the province “gradually becoming an industrial
powerhouse in China.”23 Zhang, who accumulated a tremendous amount of wealth while
receiving the rank of third-class state minister in the process, became a prominent
constitutionalist. The reason that many industrialists with capital in the late Qing dynasty is that
they wished to advance their political power after achieving financial successes. According to
East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, traditional Confucianism ranked
occupations from the highest to the lowest as “gentry officials, peasant farmers, craftsmen, and
merchants.”24 Consequently, wealthy businessmen had long attempted to raise their social status
by converting their financial capital into political power. Historically, their method was to
purchase titles from governmental officials, yet these titles often came without any real power.
The Westernization Movement in the late Qing dynasty gave them hope of acquiring such
power; the influx of western information combined with Qing’s defeat to a politically
westernized Japan allowed these industrialists to push for a constitutional monarchy. Thereby,
these industrialists, who were almost all ethnically Han, may have the chance to break the
monopoly of power by the Manchurian royals. And inevitably, this would incur an internal
conflict as the absolute monarchist fought back to perverse their power.

4.2 Revolution of 1911: A Qing Government Weakened by Internal Conflicts Between
Constitutionalists and Absolute Monarchist
During the Revolution of 1911, the Qing dynasty was weakened by this internal conflict
between the constitutionalists and absolute monarchists, for the monarchists’ strong resistance
against this political reform pushed constitutionalist officials to lose hopes of getting political
power in the Qing dynasty and therefore flipped to the revolution. One of the key turning points
in the Xinhai Revolution was the defection of the Qing dynasty’s Jiangsu Governor, Dengquan
Cheng, twenty-five days after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. Prior to his defection,
senior Qing officials were still reluctant in joining the revolutionists due to fears of losing their
property, power, or lives. Yet, the fact that Cheng, the first provincial-level Qing official to join
the revolution, was immediately reinstated as governor by the revolutionists encouraged more
and more provincial leaders to leave the side of the Qing dynasty. Within a week after Cheng’s
defection, “Governor Bingkun Shen of Guangxi Province, Governor Jiabao Zhu of Anhui
Province, Viceroy Mingqi Zhang of Guangxi and Guangdong, and Governor Baoqi Sun of
Shandong Province” all declared independence from the Qing dynasty according to The
Revolution of 1911: Turning Point in Modern Chinese History.25 Therefore, examining the
reason behind the first flipped governor becomes crucial. In the article “Considering the Yuan
23
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Shih-kai Commemorative Silver One Dollar” published by China Guardian, it was discovered
that Governor Cheng “telegraphed the Qing court to reshuffle the cabinet, establish a constitution
in order to counteract the revolution after the Wuchang Uprising”26 Yet, no evidence showed the
Qing government replied. And “Cheng then declared independence from the Qing dynasty.”27 In
fact, this is hardly the only event that connected Cheng to the constitutional movement. The
governor not only fully supported aforementioned industrialist Zhang Jian’s proposal to establish
a constitutional monarchy and organize a responsible cabinet, but also listed his name on
Viceroy of Manchuria Xiliang’s petition to the throne on October 25, 1910, advocating for a
political reform towards a constitutional monarchy and proving his constitutionalist identity
accordingly.28 However, all these attempts failed as the royal government refused to set up a
Parliament by 1911 which was explicitly written in the memorial. All these failures combined
pushed Governor Cheng to lose hope of any real constitutional reforms in the Qing dynasty.
Therefore, he flipped to the revolution in 1911, becoming the turning point of the Xinhai
Revolution. Since then, an increasing number of senior officials left the Qing dynasty—the
imperial dynasty lost its last supporters—making it merely a matter of time before its collapse.
5. Conclusion
The Qing dynasty managed to sustain its rule after the Taiping Rebellion since the
revolted people lacked a guiding ideology that would draw support from within the Qing
government. In fact, the mob-like ideology reflected in the rebellion united senior officials in the
Qing government to defend their lives and social status. On top of this, the Taiping Rebellion
also faced a Qing dynasty strengthened by foreign aid while the rebellion itself failed to secure
favorable foreign intervention due to its insistence on an opium ban. Finally, severe internal
conflicts that would weaken the Qing government during a domestic revolt did not come during
the 1850s as their appearances required an event like the Taiping Rebellion to trigger.
On the other hand, the Qing dynasty crumbled upon the Revolution of 1911 because the
revolution’s ideology appealed to the personal interests of senior Qing officials, breaking the
imperial dynasty from the inside. Additionally, the leader of the revolution chose a practical
approach in dealing with foreign power’s interests in China and the mutual constraints of actions
among foreign powers in China also appeared, limiting foreign intervention in the course of the
war. At last, the internal conflict between the constitutionalists and the absolute monarchist
broke out around the time of the Xinhai Revolution, further weakening the imperial dynasty.
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Shikata Ga Nai:
Statelessness and Sacrifice for Japanese-American Volunteers
During the Second World War
Kenzo E. Okazaki
Middlebury College

“Herd ‘em up, pack ‘em off and give ‘em the inside room in the badlands. Let ‘em be pinched, hurt,
hungry and dead up against it...let us have no patience with the enemy or with anyone whose veins carry
his blood...personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.”1
-Henry McLemore, Columnist, Hearst Newspapers

Introduction
Fundamental to the American experiment since its inception is the question of how a
nation of immigrants can confront race and difference in ensuring the ability of its citizens to
pursue a dignified life within it. Racism and discrimination have never been confined to
presidents or to the public. The legal system has produced some of the most concerning racial
injustices throughout the history of the United States.2 The supposed objectivity behind which
these injustices are masked renders them all the more insidious.
Japanese Americans represent some of the most notable victims of legal racism in the
form of their internment during the Second World War. The memory and legacy of this event has
served as a motivation for “Japanese Americans to forge sympathetic connections with...new
immigrant groups who are at risk of suffering the same racist mistreatment.”3 In an amicus brief
Henry McLemore, “This Is War! Stop Worrying About Hurting Jap Feelings,” Seattle Times, January 30, 1942,
accessed November 9, 2019, http://densho.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Documents_SPW.pdf.
2
This kind of injustice is evident in the legal fiction of the enslaved as both people and property and the resultant
three-fifths clause. Indeed, Malick W. Ghachem described how this clause issued from the absurd view of “‘the
mixt’ character of persons who were also property, things that were also persons.” “The Slave’s Two Bodies: The
Life of an American Legal Fiction,” William and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 4 (Oct. 2003): 810.
3
Jane Naomi Iwamura, “Critical Faith: Japanese Americans and the Birth of a New Civil Religion,” American
Quarterly 59, no. 3 (Sep. 2007): 943.
1
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submitted to the Supreme Court in opposition to the President Trump’s “Muslim ban,” the
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) reiterated sentiment from their amicus brief in
Hirabayashi v. United States writing that they “look[ed] to this Court, as the guardians of the
liberties of all the people of the United States...to protect them from such discrimination as
this...not for their sake alone, but also for the sake of every minority racial group in American
life.”4 The JACL argued that the president’s policy appealed to public fear of the “other” to
justify extreme measures to ensure national security which was similarly apparent in the years
leading up to internment. There are distinct dangers in this scramble for security with regard to
the law and those subject to it. The JACL wrote later in their brief that, “the Government insists
that this Court must accept its talismanic incantation of ‘national security’ and shirk its core
responsibility to take a hard look at arbitrary, discriminatory, and harmful treatment of a
disfavored group.”5 Justice Sonia Sotomayor went so far as to write in her dissent of Trump v.
Hawaii that in sanctioning a discriminatory travel ban “in the name of a superficial claim of
national security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and
merely replaces one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”6 This sense of déja-vu was made all
the more tangible in the Government’s recently announced plans to detain immigrants at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma, a base once used as an internment camp for Japanese Americans.7 The
imprisonment of over a hundred thousand Issei (“first-generation”) and Nisei (“secondgeneration”) Japanese immigrants on the basis of their ancestry lives on in American
consciousness not only as the “defining moment...that both informs and haunts JapaneseAmerican identity...to this day,” but also as a revelation regarding the nature of rights and
resistance in times of crisis.8 The Supreme Court and surrounding legal discourse placed
Japanese-American internment outside of legal jurisdiction. Those within the camps were thus
condemned to a life lacking political qualification and juridical personhood. Faced with the
dangers of this condition, interned Japanese Americans who served in the U.S. military
consciously laid claim to the American political community through the sacrifice of their lives.
These soldiers therefore performed a thoroughly political act of resistance rather than of pure
patriotism.
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A Failure to Protect
Scholarly consensus in the wake of World War II has recognized the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order 9066, which authorized the internment of Japanese Americans. Indeed, most
scholars concur that “Korematsu is a tainted precedent, more reviled than respected.”9 The
current Supreme Court has affirmed this sentiment. In the recent and highly contentious case of
Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “the forcible relocation of U. S. citizens to
concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and
outside the scope of Presidential authority.”10 The defining work on this issue, the 1983 report of
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, offers some insight into the
court’s desire to condemn this ruling. The report concluded that military necessity did not justify
the exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans.11 Instead, the “causes that shaped these
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”12 The 1942
report of Lt. General DeWitt, who both recommended and oversaw the removal of Japanese
Americans from the West Coast, confirms the discriminatory premise of this order. He wrote
simply: “the Japanese race is an enemy race.”13 In his 1943 testimony before the House Naval
Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, he elaborated that “we must worry about
the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”14 In his dissent in Korematsu v. United
States, Justice Frank Murphy cited General DeWitt’s blatant racism to indicate that internment
was the result of an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military
necessity.”15 Justice Murphy went on to argue that DeWitt had cast suspicion over an entire
racial group and undermined the principle of individual culpability, a key tenet of American
jurisprudence. Korematsu, then, represented nothing less than the “legalization of racism.”16 This
landmark case set precedent which would not be overturned until 2018.17
Having established that Korematsu is nearly universally held to represent an affront to
American jurisprudence, it is clear that the Supreme Court failed in its responsibility to protect
the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. This comes as no surprise to David Cole who
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holds as conventional wisdom that “courts are ineffective as guardians of liberty when the
general public is clamoring for security.”18 Re-examining the nature of legal decisions in times of
emergency demonstrates, however, that this scholarly consensus falls short in its explanatory
capacity and reveals the extra-legality of Japanese-American internment. Cole cites numerous
causes of the court’s inadequacy. Two of these, which are painfully clear in the case of JapaneseAmerican internment, not only indicate that Cole is correct in his thesis but substantiate an even
larger claim: internment represented an event beyond the pale of legal-jurisdiction altogether.
Cole writes that courts fare poorly in times of war as they cannot stand above the crisis because
of their inability to access complete information.19 This informational deficit is evident in the
suppression of evidence in Korematsu. In a 1941 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence,
the Ringle Report for short, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle concluded that “the entire
‘Japanese Problem’ has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical
characteristics of the people.”20 He further emphasized the problematic racial nature of this issue
by indicating that suspicion should not be held to a greater degree of those of Japanese descent
than on Germans, Italians, and communists.21 As such, Ringle recommended that concerns about
Japanese Americans should be handled case by case “and not on a racial basis.”22 The
conclusions of this report seriously undermined the claim of military necessity advanced by the
United States, especially considering the fact that descendants of other “enemy” groups were not
similarly interned or suspected.23 The Solicitor General, however, withheld this report from the
Supreme Court during its deliberations on two landmark cases regarding internment,
Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsu v. United States.24 In 2011, the office of the
Solicitor General of the United States released a statement which confessed to the grave wrong
done by their office with regard to the Ringle Report. The acting Solicitor General at the time,
Neal Katyal, confirmed that “by the time the cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu
reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General had learned of a key intelligence report that
undermined the rationale behind the internment.”25 The Solicitor General in question, Charles
Fahy, justified his dishonesty with the court on largely racial grounds. Indeed, in defending his
David Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,” The
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19
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suppression of evidence, Fahy referenced the disloyalty and racial solidarity of Japanese
Americans.26 This suppression was not inconsequential as it was later employed to overturn
Korematsu’s conviction in district court.27
More concerning in understanding the failure of the Supreme Court in times of crisis, in
that it is independent of the facts of the case itself, is the tendency of the court to rule in favor of
the government amid concerns regarding legitimacy. Indeed, “courts must worry that if they rule
against the government on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their
credibility and legitimacy.”28 In other words, should the president disagree with their decision,
they may refuse to enforce it and reveal the impotence of the court. Worcester v. Georgia is one
ruling that illustrates this danger. In this case, the court ruled that the Cherokee nation was a
dependent sovereign state protected from interference by citizens of Georgia.29 The court could
do no more than watch, however, as President Andrew Jackson flaunted the ruling and allowed
the removal of Cherokees to proceed.30 The snub of their legitimacy at the hands of the president
was well summarized by President Jackson himself who reportedly remarked: “John Marshall
made the decision; let him enforce it.”31 As he evaluated the Korematsu case, this concern was at
the forefront of Justice Jackson’s consciousness. He worried that should the court rule against the
government, “the War Relocation Authority might refuse to comply with the courts' orders.”32
His dissenting opinion, then, represented a great risk as he admitted in a 1951 lecture. He
confessed: “my view, if followed, would come close to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
or recognition of a state of martial law at the time and place found proper for military control.”33
The question of legitimacy was not lost on President Roosevelt who discussed plans to
defy a ruling against the order with Justice Jackson.34 According to Justice Jackson, Roosevelt
had admitted “that outright defiance of the court was possible.”35 Roosevelt did not merely
contemplate this possibility but had prepared to execute it in the past. During a 1935 case which
challenged his executive order to abandon the gold standard, Roosevelt drafted a radio speech
which reads:
To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried through to
its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the economic and political security of
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this nation that the legislative and executive officers of the Government look beyond the
narrow letter of contractual obligations, so that they may sustain the substance.36
The threat of Presidential defiance thus loomed over the court as it put together its majority
opinion. The most vehement critic of Justice Jackson’s position was Justice Frankfurter who was
careful to revise Justice Black’s first draft of the Korematsu decision in a way that ensured
“judicial deference.”37 Cole and other scholars are thus correct in understanding that courts are
ineffective when confronted with military emergency.
These influences which led the court to produce such an abhorrent ruling in Korematsu,
however, amounted to more than a failure in their stewardship of liberty. The shortcomings of
the judicial branch culminated, in this case, in an expulsion from the American political
community by means of rendering Japanese American internment extra-legal. An analysis of the
opinions of the court, concurrences, and dissents in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu reveals the
unique orientation of the internment camp. Perhaps wishing to invoke Cicero’s famous
statement, “when arms speak the laws are silent” (silent enim leges inter arma), Justice Frank
Murphy wrote in his concurring opinion in the unanimously decided Hirabayashi that the mere
existence of a state of war does not entail the suspension of constitutional rights.38 He went on,
however, to write in concurrence that because of the “urgent necessity of taking prompt and
effective action…against the risk of sabotage and espionage, the military authorities should not
be required to conform to standards of regulatory action appropriate to normal times.”39 Finally,
he briefly noted that “modern war does not always wait for the observance of procedural
requirements.”40 Justice William Douglas similarly wrote that the judicial branch “cannot sit in
judgment on the military requirements of that hour.”41 Here, Justice Douglas explicitly
recognized that the court could or would not render judgment on such issues. In this refusal,
Justice Douglas placed the exclusion orders made by the military beyond the reach of legal
judgment.
Turning to the case of Korematsu, Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred with the court
writing that to describe “a military order that expresses an allowable judgment of war needs...as
‘an unconstitutional order’ is to suffuse a part of the constitution with an atmosphere of
unconstitutionality.”42 The logical conclusion of Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning is that the
suspension of law is an element integral to the Constitution itself. In his dissent of the opinion
rendered by the court in Korematsu, Justice Robert Jackson found the detention of Japanese
Americans to be unconstitutional and racist, yet wrote in conclusion that he did “not suggest that
36

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, vol. 3 of The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1960), 258.
37
Peter Irons, Justice at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 332.
38
Cicero, Pro Milone, trans. N.H. Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 17; Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
39
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).

33

the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task.”43 Thus, in
both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Justices of the Supreme Court either recognized the
suspension of law as integral to times of war or that the Judicial branch could or would not
interfere with the military even in the case of violations of constitutional rights. In both cases, the
Supreme Court therefore affirmed that Japanese-American internment fell outside of the
jurisdiction of the law altogether. So much for Justice Murphy’s reply to Cicero.
The Supreme Court was not, however, solely responsible for this expulsion from legal
jurisdiction. Sarah Ludington, a law professor at Campbell University, draws attention to the
surprising phenomenon that “few law professors commented critically-or even uncritically-about
the government’s domestic policies during the war” of which Japanese-American internment
represented one of the most controversial. 44 Despite the unmistakable unconstitutionality of the
program, academics, much like the court, experienced pressures which discouraged them from
facilitating legal discourse surrounding it. The government employed many academics during the
war and therefore economically hindered their desire to decry government policy.45 Additionally,
“academics – like many Americans – may have been willing to turn a blind eye to civil rights
abuses...in the interests of winning the war.”46 Thus, in the face of economic pressure and
wartime hysteria, the legal academy was either unmotivated or incapable of defending the rights
of Japanese Americans. This striking failure is no small issue. Indeed, by failing to criticize the
policy, academics implicitly conceded that internment had no place in the realm of legal
discussion. It would be incorrect to claim, however, that no academics spoke out. Ludington
specifically cites a few cases where professors from law schools such as Yale, Harvard, and
William and Mary criticized government policy under the protection of their “robust culture of
academic freedom.”47 It is unfortunate and alarming, though, that these professors were merely
an exception to an otherwise disturbing rule.
Rightlessness and the Internment Camp
Internment’s orientation outside of legal jurisdiction placed those within the camps in
alarming danger with the loss of their juridical person. Juridical personhood “comes into being
when political authority towards persons is expressed through an institutional order that bears
attributes of stability such as predictability, intelligibility, and contestability.”48 The very nature
of the camp was an essential component in depriving Japanese Americans of their juridical
person. Indeed, Arendt contended that the loss of the juridical person was only completed “by
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placing the concentration camp outside the normal penal system, and by selecting its inmates
outside the normal judicial procedure.”49 Rights are the essential elements which protect citizens
in normal judicial proceedings in that they represent the conditions under which political
authority is expressed. The destruction of the juridical person is thus identical with being without
rights or, as Hannah Arendt described this condition, “rightlessness.” It is clear that the court’s
affirmation of the suspension of law which internment entailed licensed the deprival of the most
basic of constitutional rights.50 According to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, those imprisoned in the camps quickly learned that “Constitutional
rights were not an individual and personal guarantee if one were an American of Japanese
ancestry.”51 This claim is more than one of inequality or deprivation. Arendt wrote that the plight
of the rightless person “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for
them.”52 This condition is embodied in the concept of citizenship insofar as it represents, for
Arendt, the right to have rights.53 This is an exact parallel to the experience of interned Japanese
Americans. Though the “government never formally stripped Japanese Americans of their
citizenship...it in effect...nullified their citizenship.”54 Victor Izui, a volunteer from camp in
Minidoka, Idaho, was keenly aware of this condition as he scoffed at a question about whether he
felt American. He retorted simply: “how could you feel American? They took away your
citizenship!”55
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What, then, is the precise meaning of this exile from political existence? Aristotle
famously wrote that “man is by nature a political animal.”56 Humans, for Aristotle, are animals
with the capacity to organize themselves politically, and this type of organization is the end
which separates man from all other animals, with whom he otherwise, on a biological basis,
shares much in common.57 In the absence of a political community, then, individuals are left in a
mere biological state. Though the deprival of constitutional rights is egregious in itself, the
dangers of this state of being bereft of rights and extra-legal orientation produced an even greater
danger as “the first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in
man.”58 Arendt argued that that her thesis was at work in Nazi Germany, where Jewish
individuals were deprived of any legal protection and, in short, “a condition of complete
rightlessness was created before the right to live was challenged.”59 Interned Japanese Americans
were reduced to a life unqualified by the ability to possess legal or political rights and thus
placed in alarming danger.
It would seem that this return to life stripped of its political qualification is the precise
case in which one may claim the protections of human rights, yet this was not possible. Again,
Arendt’s work offers a useful tool of analysis and forecloses the possibility of seeking protection
in anything but a political community. She wrote that in the absence of rights accorded by
citizenship, people attempt to lay claim to their inborn rights, yet these rights are in natural
opposition to civilization and are thus immediately suspect.60 While these inborn rights are based
on unchanging principles of humanity, civilization is based on the principle of equality which is
necessarily not inherent. Indeed, “we are not born equal; we become equal as members of a
group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”61 Izui
confronted this reality as he realized that “[the Constitution] didn’t mean anything. It was just a
piece of paper.”62 Izui recognized that the Constitution carried little force for Japanese
Americans who had been expelled as subjects of this document. Though the Constitution and the
rights which it establishes were intended by the framers to represent “certain unalienable Rights,”
as described by the Declaration of Independence, these supposedly inborn rights immediately
lost force with the exile of Japanese Americans from the community which would guarantee
them.63 Indeed, in her analysis of the development of human rights, Arendt wrote that “the
moment human beings lacked their own government...no authority was left to protect them and
no institution was willing to guarantee them.”64 The term “inborn rights,” is, therefore, an
56
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oxymoron. Furthermore, claiming these rights gives rise to another unique danger. Arendt argues
that this opposition between the claim to natural rights and equality through organization remind
states “of the limitations of human activity.”65
For this reason, Arendt claims, “highly developed political communities, such as the
ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they
hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and
differentiation” which represent the areas which man cannot change and which they tend to
destroy in forms such as ethnic cleansing.66 The interned were thus confronted with the necessity
of regaining their place in the American community in the absence of their juridical person.
The internment diary of Hatsuye Egami offers a material illustration of this abstract claim
in representing the human experience of a life deprived of its juridical person. Egami was born in
Tokyo in 1902 and immigrated to the United States in 1921.67 Besides this and limited
information about Egami’s family, little is known about her life.68 Her diary begins on May 12,
1942, immediately before she is to be relocated to the Tulare Assembly Center. As she reflects
on the whirlwind of relocation, she laments that “since yesterday, we Pasadena Japanese have
ceased to be human beings – we are now simply numbers or things. We are no longer ‘Egamis’
but the number 23324.”69 The Egamis thus immediately recognize that the loss of their rights is
tantamount to a lack of humanity itself. It is this feeling which Arendt explains as she considers
human rights. Paradoxically, though these inborn rights are meant to apply precisely in the case
where a person lacks a political community willing to ensure legal rights and therefore has
nothing to claim but his or her humanity, “the opposite is the case…a man who is nothing but a
man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellowman.”70 Egami continues her reflection in describing her hope for the future despite her
realization of their expulsion from the body politic. She wrote: “it may be that in a naked life
there is poetry and truth. I think that from this bare life we can weave something creative and
interesting. The person that can do that is one who is really intelligent and wise.”71
Egami’s words prove prophetic as it is precisely through the body itself that Japanese
Americans crafted lives of dignity and resistance in the face of such ominous conditions. The
nullification of citizenship for Japanese Americans which placed them in such alarming danger
also posed a challenge to their resistance. They had not lost their rights, but the right to possess
them in the first place. Thus, challenges based on a claim of rights could only fail. Their natural
life without political qualification also possessed no rights in itself. Their only hope, then, was to
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regain that right which precluded them from the others, their membership in the American
political community, through the sacrifice of the bare corpus.
Volunteering as a Political Act
Though some volunteers chose to sacrifice their lives, others refused to serve on the basis
of the violation of their rights. The position of the JACL at the time was that Japanese Americans
should join the U.S. army in order to prove their loyalty.72 The League went so far as to suggest a
suicide battalion of Japanese American soldiers who would be sent to die in impossible
missions.73 There were, however, a considerable number of internees who refused to serve on the
grounds that they had been denied their constitutional rights. These “no-no boys” claimed that
they could not be expected to perform their obligations as citizens when their citizenship had
been nullified.74 For them, it was “absurd to ask any interned individual to defend American
democracy from behind barbed wire.”75 A great deal of conflict erupted between these groups
within the camps. Robert Ichikawa, a volunteer from the Amache, Colorado, internment camp
recalled: “all the no-no boys, you know they called us all kinds of names, they called us dogs,
inu.”76
In some cases, the tension between the two groups was so extreme that it resulted in
violence. Those Japanese Americans educated in Japan were commonly referred to as “kibei”
and were generally opposed to volunteering to serve. Masaru Ishida, another volunteer from
Topaz, Utah, recalled: “We had some kibeis, well they were mean you know?”77 He goes on to
tell a story about his friend saying: “He nearly got killed because, you know, he said ‘volunteer,
volunteer!’”78 This was not an isolated event in Topaz. Ishida recalled that he had to help another
friend run away because “they were gonna kill him too because he was pro-serving the
country.”79 This opposition ran so deeply that it often affected the families of volunteers as well.
Izui learned after the war that once he had left for training, some parents of the no-no boys “came
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to [his] mother and gave her a real bad time.”80 The resentment flowed both ways. Kaihara,
remembers that “at first I resented [no-no boys] being that way, but after giving it a great deal of
thought…I might have done the same thing.”81 Kaihara’s newfound sympathy is shared by
revisionist historians who have come to define each action as “complementary species of
praiseworthy Americanism” in order to combat the no-no boys’ widespread ostracism from not
only American society but also from that of the Japanese-American community.82 Despite this
claim of respect for each position, there remains an opposition between these two responses
insofar as scholars often hold that though those who refused to serve made a political statement
of resistance, those who volunteered were apolitical and concerned only with patriotic duty.
Some scholars have gone so far as to label the apparent pure patriotism of volunteers
from internment camps as a “‘blind obedience’ response to injustice.” 83 At the surface level, the
oral histories of once interned veterans seem to support this claim. Ishida remembers his mother
telling him to serve in a simple imperative: “You gotta be patriotic.”84 Similarly, though Izui did
not feel initially inclined to volunteer, it was his mother who convinced him to join. Izui
remembers that “she urged loyalty, unstinting loyalty to my country, even if she was wrong in
interning us.”85 This sentiment was echoed by Jimmy Konno who said as he described his
reasons for serving rather than resisting: “If you’re gonna live in this country, you gotta do
something, and if you wanna resist I won’t go against ya, that’s your decision.”86
Further examination reveals, however, that the loyalty of these volunteers was far from
blind. Stanley Hayami, a volunteer from the Heart Mountain internment camp, wrote: “Do I
think it was constitutional? No, I do not. We did not go through due process of law…Do I think
racial prejudice was involved? Yes.”87 Izui recalled feeling betrayed by the promises of the
American experiment saying: “all that stuff that they taught us in school, what the heck does that
mean? What a sham.”88 Yasunori Deguchi, a volunteer from Hawaii, expressed a similar
sentiment when he learned about internment from the mainland volunteers. He was astounded
that “the country we were supposed to have gotten the right information from school
days…turned out to be this.”89 Far from being blindly obedient, Japanese-American volunteers
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had a deep understanding of the wrongs they had endured. Conrad Kurahara summarizes this
feeling well saying: “deep down we knew what a terrible wrong it was.”90 How can one then
reconcile their ultimate decision to serve in an apparently patriotic fashion with this critical
political consciousness?
The interviews and diaries of volunteers from camp reveal a common awareness and fear
of being without a state. This crisis motivated many to volunteer in order to claim their place in
the American political community and was thus consistent with their political consciousness as it
was their only viable means of protection. Though many initially responded to the draft like
Mitsuo Kodama who recalls: “I was so mad, I said: ‘to Hell with the United States Army, I
wouldn’t join you guys for nothin’” or Victor Izui who said simply and emphatically, “Up your
ass, Uncle Sam!” they eventually volunteered to avert the dangers of being without a state.91
Indeed, Kodama decided to serve when confronted by his mother who told him:
You were born and raised in the United States, you only have one country and that
country is America, the United States. If you went to Japan you would not be accepted as
a Japanese you are a ‘Gaijin,’ which is a foreigner, so, therefore, you will be treated like a
foreigner and you will not be accepted as a Japanese and your life will be miserable in
Japan.92
Kodama’s initial hope to become part of the Japanese political community implicitly confirms
the necessity of joining one of these communities in order to regain one’s ability to possess
rights. As other social factors would prevent his inclusion in Japan, his only option was to
reclaim his American citizenship by serving in the military. Hayami expresses this same concern
and realizes that it is imperative to lay claim to citizenship and the rights it entails. As he
contemplated volunteering, he wrote: “now the people outside want to take our citizenship
away...if they take our citizenship away from us we’ll be people without a country!”93 Though
Hayami did not, perhaps, realize that he already occupied a position in which his citizenship was
nullified, the fear he feels at the thought of being without a country indicates that these
volunteers were aware of the dangers they faced in the absence of one. Lloyd Kurihara, a
volunteer from the Poston, Arizona internment camp also echoed this same sentiment saying
simply: “I had no other place to go.”94 Though seemingly non-political, this statement also
carries the urgency of membership in a community. These volunteers, should they desire to
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ensure their safety and that of their community, had to make a claim to political inclusion, yet it
was their very exclusion which foreclosed the possibility of doing so through rights claims.
Having been reduced to a body lacking political significance, it was only through the physical
body that a viable challenge to their political alienation was possible.
This fear of statelessness and the urgency of regaining of political community could only
be achieved by the sacrifice of the pure, biological body. These volunteers often indicate that
they did not think in terms of rights questions at the time of their internment. When asked if he
thought in terms of constitutional rights, Thomas Kaihara, whose father was interned at Tule
Lake, replied: “not at that time.”95 Similarly, Izui’s mother convinced him to serve and “kept
stressing…duty more than rights.”96 Simply because they did not think in terms of rights, though,
did not mean that their actions were apolitical. Indeed, having established that the extra-legal
nature of internment entailed the inability to lay claim to rights in the first place, claiming rights
as a form of resistance would be futile and ineffective. In the absence of legal rights and the
ability to challenge for them, the only way to lay claim to the political community which could
then grant them these rights was by risking and sacrificing their lives on the battlefield. Kaihara
said: “if I got killed in combat, at least my brother can say: ‘look, my brother gave his life for his
country.’ They can walk up the street with their heads high.”97 This is not merely a claim of pride
for Kaihara’s brother, but rather indicates that the sacrifice of his life would gain his family
inclusion in the
American political community as they could once again walk its streets with dignity. The
actions of these volunteers, then, represented a thoroughly political statement in that it
represented the re-integration of human biological existence into a community.
Conclusion
The Japanese Americans who fought for the United States went on to become the most
decorated troops of the war in the 442nd and the 100th infantry battalion.98 Through their bravery,
they earned their inclusion in the American body politic. This achievement was most famously
recognized by President Truman who remarked “you fought not only the enemy, but you fought
prejudice – and you have won.”99 This story of success, however, has often been used to support
a myth which holds that Asian Americans “did not make waves, overcame prejudice, and turned
into good solid middle-class citizens.”100 The story of Japanese-American volunteers has become
a paradigmatic case which has been mobilized to argue that success is possible even in the most
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oppressive conditions when people are not so concerned with political claims and work harder to
overcome them. A 1949 article about the post-war race relations of Japanese American and white
soldiers hints at this argument. To the author, interaction between these soldiers at a football
game demonstrated that “if you don’t run around squalling about minorities and their rights, but
simply take action...very few people...will give it a second thought.”101 The language of this text
illustrates a somewhat demeaning tone with regard to those Japanese Americans who refused to
fight because of the nullification of their rights and, more broadly, to those who attempt to create
social change for disadvantaged groups. To proponents of this myth, “Asian Americans vindicate
the American Dream.”102 This myth is thus used to maintain the status quo, for those who believe
in it may indicate that the disadvantages which other minorities face are simply a result of their
poor effort. The blame for their conditions is thus shifted away from American society and
placed squarely on the shoulders of those who it disadvantages. Examining Japanese-American
volunteers, then, reveals that their success was not because of a lack of focus on the political or a
willing investment in the society which had deprived them. The underpinnings of myths of Asian
success are called into question. Those who volunteered were not blindly obedient, unaware, or
unwilling to challenge for rights; they understood that they lacked the ability to make such
claims in exile from their political community in their given historical context. Perhaps one of
the most common phrases used by Japanese Americans during internment gains another meaning
in this context. “Shikata Ga Nai” is a Japanese phrase meaning: “it cannot be helped.” Those that
used this phrase did not mean their situation was helpless, but perhaps that they had little
recourse other than to do whatever was necessary to rejoin the American community. The
dangers they faced without this community were such that their ultimate sacrifice to regain their
place within it truly could not be helped. One is then left to contemplate how it is that such a
sacrifice was necessary and realize that this was not triumph, but tragedy.
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The Importance of Morocco in
the Spanish Civil War
Jarod E. Ramirez
University of California, Santa Barbara

Introduction
The Spanish Civil War was essentially the prelude to World War Two and has been
subject to many analyses about the course of events and its impact. These analyses mostly focus
on aspects of the battles, the social changes that occurred in places such as Catalonia, and the
ways various world powers were involved. Most of the talk about the Spanish Civil War is
Eurocentric, which makes sense because it occurred in Spain and European powers were
involved in the fighting. However, what is often forgotten is that Spain was at the time a colonial
power with holdings in Northern Morocco and Equatorial Guinea. There is little discussion on
the impact that these colonies had on the war nor on how colonized people were involved. This is
despite the fact that the main revolt that started the war did not occur in Spain but in a Moroccan
Colony and that Francisco Franco, the main general on the Nationalist side and future dictator of
Spain, began his career fighting in Morocco.
Morocco’s significance to the Spanish Civil War has been hidden largely due to a lack of
historical context of the war along with the racism that permeated from it. When the war is
discussed, it can sometimes be mistaken as a conflict that only involved Spanish soldiers. In
reality, the combatants were people from all across the world, including but not limited to Cuba,
Russia, America, and most relevant to this article, Morocco. The Spanish Republic is framed as a
progressive democracy and as Socialist by historians, yet what is forgotten is that the Spanish
Republic retained colonies in Africa until 1936. While the Nationalist forces were far more antidemocratic and authoritarian, the exclusion of the Republic’s colonial aspirations creates an
incomplete history that obscures vital aspects of the war. What is found by studying Morocco is
the very foundations of the Civil War, both in terms of the people who fought and its origins.
Spanish and Moroccan history have been connected since the very foundation of the
modern Spanish state. The Umayyad caliphate invaded Iberia in 711 and introduced a direct
connection between North Africa and the Peninsula. For the next seven hundred years, the
Muslim kingdoms of Spain would be the center of a multi-religious and cultural fusion that
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marks Spain to this day. However, by the 14th Century, the northern Catholic Kingdoms of
Aragon and Nevarre would begin the Reconquista, the reconquering of Spain in the name of
Catholicism. By 1469, the peninsula was unified into two Christian monarchies comprising
Portugal and Spain.1
The early seeds of beliefs that would later comprise both Colonialism and Fascism were
planted in this event. The end of the war brought with it a purge of any non-Catholic religious
beliefs in the peninsula. The Catholic Monarchy and Church established the Inquisition whose
goal was to convert or kill any Muslim, Jewish, or secular elements still remaining on the
continent. Religion was believed by the Spanish church as transferable by blood and this belief
developed into the racialization of non-Catholic people as non-white which helped to develop a
white Spanish hierarchy.2 This idea would influence Spanish society for some time and would
later be imported to the Americas in the form of the Racial Casta system. This is not surprising,
considering that the Reconquista was still ongoing in 1492 when colonization of the Americas
began. However, the Spanish belief of racial superiority would largely be fueled by their
perception of “The Moor.” Mauraphobia and Mauraphillia were spawned from the conquest and
would seek to other the Moor by combining Christian imagery with the killing of non-believers.
The image of “The Moor'' was depicted through Moros y Cristianos, local events that celebrate
the conquest and Catholicization of Spain while denigrating the Moors. Another Maurophobic
image is that of Saint James Matamoros the Moor Killer.3 Both of these symbols would serve as
a way to other their enemies by depicting them as the non-white and non-Christian other
wherever Spain colonized.
Spanish Fascism would be born largely in the colonization of Morocco. Fascism has been
argued as Colonialism brought home4 and the creation of the Nationalist movement in Spain
lends support to this claim. The means and tactics by which the Civil War was fought can be
traced to Morocco and despite being a Spanish War, the Nationalist forces were made up of large
numbers of Moroccan recruits. This alone can attest to the importance of understanding
Morocco, but its vital role goes beyond this as the foundations of the war and its outcome were
decided by whichever power had Morocco on its side. Morocco’s forces and strategic value
created the most advantageous position for Franco and the Nationalist forces which prolonged
the war to its eventual conclusion. Had Morocco not been a supply zone of well-trained troops,
the Nationalist forces on the Peninsula would have been evenly matched with Republican forces.
Morocco, with its interconnected history, created the foundation for Fascism and the
inclusion of Moroccans in Nationalist forces contributed to the end of Republican Spain.
Furthermore, the complete failure of Republican Spain to ferment an independence revolt in
Morocco was not only an example of the colonialist views of the Leftists forces in Spain, but a
vital reason for the Republic's ultimate defeat.
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Colonialism as Fascism’s Birthplace
Spain began to colonize Morocco in 1909. This point in time is significant as the Spanish
Empire had lost its Latin American colonies. In the mind of the Spanish Monarchy and
government, Morocco was a way to regain national prominence. The occupation of Morocco and
the Rif Wars of the 1920’s would be the fundamental place for the birth of Spanish Fascism. The
attitude of Spain towards Morocco was the same as the views of any other European colonizer,
framing Moroccans as backwards people that had to be civilized by Europeans. What is notable
about the Spanish colonization of Morocco is that the forces used to suppress the Moroccans
would come to be the same forces that would spread Fascism throughout Spain.
For example, the officers and generals who served in the colonialist ventures were
dubbed Africanistas. These officers were more politically conservative compared to the armies
on the peninsula and most of the generals favored or actively supported the monarchy in some
way. One motivating factor for this would be that King Alfonso XIII was the main supporter and
fancier of the colonization wars.5 This conservatism was also combined with their glorification of
colonialism, as many Africanistas also looked back on the war with fond memories. They saw
themselves as crusaders coming to civilize the land with a “parental like” attitude towards the
Moroccans.6 This paternalism is notable because it developed into the most brutal and
authoritarian rule over the Moroccans. The generals developed the use of death squads in their
tactics that would be used to suppress the Republican forces in the Civil War. Another
development of the Rif Wars was the creation of one of the most important armies of the Spanish
Civil War: the Army of Africa. This army was created in order to repress all the attempts by the
Rif and Berber Tribes from uniting and fighting off the Spanish. It comprised two different
sections, most notably the Regulares section that was made up of Moroccan recruits.7 They were
used as a suppressive force to put down any resistance in the Moroccan colony. However, the
training they received in Morocco would be later used in the Civil War, such as with the use of
colonial death squads.
Another important thing to note is that the creation of these two military groups would set
the foundations for many of the future Nationalist officers. A large number of the Africanistas
would later go on to be the generals and soldiers behind the Nationalist uprising. The most
notable of these was Francisco Franco who began his career serving in the Rif War and became
the youngest officer to be promoted to general. His development was heavily connected to the
Rif Wars as he states “without Africa I can scarcely explain myself to myself, nor can I explain
myself properly to my comrades in arms.”8 He and many other Africanistas' colonialist obsession
with Morocco was so great that, in 1924 they plotted a coup against the Spanish dictator Primo
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de Rivera when he made motions indicating he wished to pull the army out.9 Indeed, to many of
these generals, Morocco was a second home, and increasingly so after the establishment of the
Second Spanish Republic in 1931. The Spanish Republic had introduced numerous reforms that
upset the army and the colonial officers. They had been upset by the cut in funding to the army,
the changes in the military command, and, most importantly, the introduction of liberal reforms
that occurred.
Not only were most of these officers conservative but they were also devout Catholics.
This is important because the Second Republic had greatly angered the church by introducing
liberal policies such as divorce and the removal of any special church powers in the 1930s.10
Many high-ranking Catholic officials of Spain directly declared the Republic illegitimate11 and
attempted to mobilize tensions and fears that the Republic was devolving into Communism and
Atheism. Priests leading congregations, the Catholic newspaper, and connected organizations
were also generating the fear and hatred that would make a Fascist coup “feasible.”12 If the
progressive reforms of society did not horrify conservative generals into adopting Fascist ideals
on their own, the Catholic church would actively pressure them into further supporting them.
Many would begin to see Spain as another Morocco, a place that had to be civilized from
“Rebellious tribes.”13 The Africanistas would look at Spain with the same paternalism intent on
bringing “civilization” to the godless. The Nationalists actively described their revolt as a
crusade or something akin to a modern Reconquista.14 Francisco Franco even described the
revolt as a “Limpieza'', or cleaning up of, everything foreign in Spain. In this case, that meant
Socialism, Democracy, and anything non-Catholic.15
The Spanish form of Fascism was directly created and developed by the colonial wars of
Morocco. The ideas and beliefs of many of the nationalist generals first formed with the
colonization of Morocco. Even if the Africanista generals were not specifically Fascist, they
would have been monarchists or devout Catholics and would have joined their respective
factions, such as the Carlists or the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (CEDA), that
would join the Nationalist side of the war. The generals that were fascist would also go on to join
the Falange Espanola de las JONS, the largest Fascist organization of the Nationalists. The JONS
part is the name of the organization: Juntas de Ofensive Nacional Sindicalista whose founding
document expressed the goal of creating a new Spanish Empire that would encompass French
Morocco as well as French Algeria.16 Fascist aspirations in Spain were either born in the
Colonial war or revolved around colonialism in some way. Many of the generals would describe
the reasons for starting the uprising using the exact same rhetoric of a colonialist war except this
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time directed at the people in Spain. It is not simply that the Generals of the Nationalists served
in Morocco. It is that their experiences and views in Morocco served as an incubation for the
later Fascist revolt which demonstrates the important foundational role that Morocco had in the
Spanish Civil War.
The Importance of Moroccans during the Civil War
Not only was Morocco key in the foundations for the Civil War, but it was also key to the
Nationalist victory. While the Republican forces of the war were generally ill equipped compared
to the Nationalists, at the start, they were generally matched when it came to the army size and in
some cases the Republican forces were much larger than the Nationalist forces. However, the
first revolt of the war was in Morocco, and in securing the colony for the Nationalist side, the
Fascists not only secured a base for the invasion of the peninsula, but they also secured the welltrained Army of Africa that would prove to be decisive in the outcome of the war.
A significant number of Moroccans would make up the Nationalist side; over 80,000
troops alone were part of the Army of Africa.17 The Moroccan soldiers recruited into this army
served as shock troops for most battles in the Civil War and were an efficient fighting force.
These troops had a number of reasons for supporting the Nationalist side ranging from
ideological to economic. Many Moroccans joined because, although Franco was ardently
Catholic, he made attempts to accommodate the Islamic beliefs of his troops. He professed the
idea of “Hispanic Moroccan Brotherhood” and helped to organize religious practices as well as
trips to Mecca for Moroccan religious leaders.18 There is also the fact that the Spanish Left was
viewed as radically atheist by some religious Moroccans who felt that Franco and the
Nationalists were the only ones fighting off the anti-religious tide of Spain. However, the two
main reasons for Moroccan support were for anti-colonial and economic reasons. The
Nationalists had promised not just autonomy to Moroccan leaders but independence for their
service.19 This swayed a good amount of support and recruitment to the Nationalist side and will
be touched upon in more detail when discussing the failure of the Spanish Republic. Another
huge factor was simple economic reasons as joining the Nationalist army and the pre-war army
paid better. Many flocked to the war or were paid as mercenaries because the current conditions
of Morocco were extremely poor.20 The conditions of the Spanish colony were underdeveloped
and dependent on Spain creating mass poverty for a majority of Moroccan families. These
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conditions were compounded by recent crop failure in the 1920s which created more poverty and
made Northern Morocco even more reliant on Spain. This pushed Moroccans to join the Army of
Africa to find a decent income. When the Fascist revolt began, these Moroccans then found
themselves serving the Nationalist side.
This heavy recruitment of Moroccans before the war had a decisive effect on the outcome
of the conflict. The Moroccan troops greatly tipped the balance of the war in the favor of the
Nationalists providing them with more numerous and experienced troops. As mentioned before,
Moroccans were used as shock troops when attacking the enemies and, aside from the physical
damage they caused, they were also used for psychological terror. The Nationalists used the very
existence of Moroccan troops as propaganda, conjuring up images of “The Moor” to insight
terror and fear in the Republican populace.21 This tactic was very effective and actually did
insight fear and outright desertion of Republican forces before battles. More importantly
however, Moroccans were present in almost every major battle in the war and served as extra
expendable troops for the Nationalists. Moroccan troops were given the deadliest assignments
and suffered the most casualties in the army because they were sent in before the rest of the
Nationalist forces.22 This tactic meant that while the Moroccans of the Army of Africa suffered
great losses, the Spanish and European forces could easily secure territory with minimal damage.
This let the Nationalists sacrifice as many lives as they wished to drain the Republican forces to
defeat.
Their importance was also seen by Nationalist leaders and they saw the Army of Africa
as their key to victory. The Fascist generals placed little faith in the troops on the peninsula and
focused heavily on securing the support of the Army of Africa before the revolt.23 The reason for
this is that, unlike the Africanistas, the Peninsulares in the mainland were more liberal in their
politics if not explicitly Socialist.24 Franco was the conservative General that seemed able to
convince the Army of Africa to revolt. It was for this reason that he was given so much
prominence by the Nationalist forces.25 This importance was also not lost on him as he saw the
Army of Africa as a way to help him secure power.26 From the perspective of most generals,
securing Morocco and the Army of Africa for their coup was the only hope for it being
successful. Morocco served as a stable base of operations and supplied a large surplus of troops
for the Nationalists. They were well trained and effective on the battlefield and the number of
soldiers could break the balance on the peninsula. Without Moroccans, the Republican side
would not have necessarily won the war, but it would have put the Nationalists at a disadvantage
and made it more difficult for them to defeat the Republican forces by 1939. This also shows
why the Nationalist revolt began in Morocco instead of on the peninsula. It wasn't just that the
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Nationalists had a secure base in Morocco, but that it was vitally important to their successful
war.
Failure of Republican and Revolutionary Policy
The people of Morocco, however, were not just important for understanding the
Nationalist victory. They were also important when understanding the Republican failure. Many
historians and observers of the war have noted how decisive an anti-Franco revolt would be for
the Republican side. They separately agree that if the Moroccans had revolted against the
Nationalists in Morocco, the Fascist forces would have been significantly weakened so as to give
the Republicans victory. This anti-Franco revolt never materialized however, and while the
Republican forces were being torn apart by infighting, the Nationalists never experienced a large
scale anti-nationalist movement in their territory. This is largely due to the Colonial policy and
views of the ostensibly Left “Revolutionary” government that discouraged any kind of anticolonial movement to form in Morocco. The actions of the Republican forces and their clinging
to colonialism made them lose all support from the Moroccan people which only helped to
further their destruction.
One of the first people to discuss the importance of a revolution in Morocco and the
main inspiration for this research was George Orwell. During the Spanish Civil War, he served in
the Trotskyist POUM militia stationed in Barcelona. He published an account of his experiences
titled Homage to Catalonia. Morocco is never mentioned in any great detail in the book,
typically being relegated to the description of the Nationalist forces he was fighting while
serving. This makes it all the more striking when he describes the failure of the Civil War and the
Republican Government. He lists a number of faults of the government and the failure of the
Spanish Revolution and then questions why the Republicans never attempted to foment a
revolution in Morocco. He states that by fomenting an uprising in Franco's rearguard, the
Nationalists would not have been able to maintain the front on the peninsula. Orwell says that all
the Popular Front had to do was to “declare Morocco liberated'' for this to happen. Instead, Spain
had attempted to placate British and French Colonialism.27 This small section from his
experiences in the war places great emphasis on the importance of the Moroccan people. He also
wrote about inciting a revolt in Morocco in 1937, a point at which the war was still not decided.
He also spoke about a revolt in Morocco as something that could easily end the war, showing
that he recognized its vital role in the conflict as he was serving. As argued in previous
paragraphs, the Moroccan troops were decisive for the Nationalists giving them a secure supply
of troops. If there was a revolt in Morocco it would not only threaten the base of Fascism,
ideologically it might lead Moroccan troops to desertion, mutiny, and to switch sides. It is
important to note that he doesn’t blame the Moroccans for not rising up against Franco but
instead blames the policy of the Popular Front Government. He directly criticized the Spanish
Government for placating European colonialism rather than pursuing a revolutionary policy. This
27
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highlights the real failure of the Republican government, that being the failure to adhere to any of
its revolutionary principles.
An Italian Anarchist involved in the Civil War, named Camillo Berneri also advocated
for a revolt in Morocco. Berneri went to Catalonia at the beginning of the revolution and was one
of the organizers for the Italian Volunteer column fighting on the Aragon Front. He argued that
because Franco's army relied heavily on a “Moorish Contingent”, granting independence to
Morocco would stir up Rebellion and demoralize the Nationalist forces.28 He also hoped that
Moroccans could be won to the side of the revolution and precipitate a revolution in North Africa
that would not only hurt Western Capitalism but also the Fascist government in Spain.29 For
Berneri the Spanish Revolution could win only on “revolutionary” terms, not on purely military
basis. A revolution in Morocco would ideologically disrupt the Nationalist forces in such a way
that mere battles could not. In this way, he also agrees with Orwell in the assertion that by
maintaining its colonial domination, the Republic greatly hurt its war effort.
The Republican government's attitude towards Morocco has a complicated and confusing
history that developed long before the Second Republic itself. During the 1920s, Spanish Leftists
were anti-colonial and condemned the invasion of Morocco. Anarchists in the CNT-FAI, the
largest Anarcho-Syndicalist labor union, staged numerous anti-war demonstrations and antirecruitment revolts in Catalonia that attempted to hurt the war effort in Morocco.30 However a
change in attitude began to emerge in 1934 during the Austrias Revolution. The Austrias
Revolution was an Anarchist and Communist led revolution that sought to establish Communism
in Spain and destroy the Second Republic. It was destroyed within a matter of weeks and was put
down by the Army of Africa under the command of Francisco Franco.31 Most of the army was
made up of Moroccans and a lot of the coverage in Republican newspapers was centered on the
image of a band of savage moors raping and massacring civilians.32 To the Spanish Working
class, Austrias would be a symbol of the “brutality” of Moroccan troops, in part developing a
racist belief amongst some of the Popular Front. As the Republican forces attempted to develop
propaganda against the largely Moroccan Nationalist forces, they developed racist depictions of
their enemy.
Although this attitude was not largely widespread as many on the Left were still very
anti-colonial, the onset of the war worsened this view. For both sides, the enemy was orientalized
as non-Spanish invading “Moors'', but the Republicans were different because they revived
Reconquista symbols.33 Republican forces resurrected the image of Saint James Matamoros
during the start of the war and also re-introduced the rallying cry “Moors a La Costa.”34 The
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rallying call was first used during the Reconquista and harkened back to the idea that the Moors
needed to be casted off entirely from the coast of Spain. The propaganda on the Republican side
also highlighted heavily the idea that their enemies were “Savage” by depicting the Army of
Africa as a band of “moors'' that were massacring and raping Spanish Women.35 Depictions and
propaganda such as this were so troubling and racist that many African Americans who served in
the International Brigades were appalled and uncomfortable with the Republican government. 36
This impart explains the colonialist attitude that the Republican government had towards
Morocco. A part of the Popular Front and soldiers did not see Moroccans as anything more than
the “Savage Moor'', a counter revolutionary enemy that had to be suppressed for serving
Fascism. Yet even this is not the full picture of the failure that was the Republic's colonial policy.
What truly doomed the Republic entirely was the clinging to European colonialism that had
created these views.
A revolt against Franco was not entirely unthinkable in Morocco and was actually more
likely regardless of the Republics policies. The Moroccans were not bound to Fascism and did
not need to be told to revolt by the Republicans as many people demonstrated their agency as
soon as the Civil War started. When the revolt first began, various cities in the north such as
Melilla revolted against the Nationalist uprising and managed to form militias that fended off the
Fascists for a few days.37 During the entire war, various Communist and independence groups
sabotaged the Fascists war efforts and helped to foment an anti-recruitment movement in
Morocco. Most of the people and many tribes in the Rif also hated Franco and supported the
Republic, convincing people not to serve in the war and holding anti-Franco demonstrations.38
His unpopularity was so strong that Franco himself feared a revolt would be imminent. He was
forced to stop recruiting from the Rif and most of Spanish Morocco and he began to recruit
mercenaries from the French colonies towards the end of the war.39 As mentioned before, the
reason that most Moroccans were held into service was for financial stability and the promise
that Morocco would either be given independence or more autonomy. This last reason, the
promise of independence was the exact same reason why there was never a full-scale revolt in
Morocco on the side of the Republic. The Spanish Republic never made any gestures towards
independence or greater autonomy for Morocco which greatly hurt Moroccan support. Despite
this, a number of Moroccans trying to gain independence directly approached the Republicans
for negotiation.
The first negotiation happened quite early on in the war. A Moroccan nationalist group
called the Moroccan Action Committee contacted French Communists in French Morocco and
got in touch with the Popular Front groups in Barcelona. David Rousset, a French Communist,
was one of the people present throughout the negotiations and saw it as his mission to convince
both the Moroccan Nationalists and Republicans to support a revolt in Morocco. He stated that “I
35
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realized that if there was a military uprising in the Spanish Rif, Franco would be caught in a cleft
stick and that, moreover, a very difficult situation would be created in the ranks of Franco’s
Moroccan troops.”40 He saw that Morocco was strategically important to the war effort in Spain
that it could both divert troops from the Spanish front lines as well as cause disruption amongst
the troops. Rousset helped to organize a meeting between Moroccan nationalists and members of
the CNT-FAI, a prominent leader in the Autonomous Catalan government.
Through negotiations with the Moroccan nationalists, the CNT-FAI and the POUM in
Catalonia discussed terms of independence. In the negotiations, the Moroccan leaders expressed
that they were ready to lead a military uprising against Franco in exchange for the recognition of
independence from the Spanish Republican Government.41 As Rousset points out however, the
treaty that was finally agreed upon by both the Moroccans and the CNT-FAI and POUM would
still maintain ties to the Spanish Government, limiting some of Morocco’s autonomy.42 He
described it as recognizing independence while still remaining close links to the metropolis and
the former colony. Despite this, it was supported by all groups including the Moroccan
representatives. It would later be fully supported by the Catalonia Generalitat, the government
representing the Catalonia autonomous region.
However, when the treaty of independence reached the larger Spanish Government in
Madrid, the negotiations broke down entirely. According to Rousset, the Moroccan committee
was met by Largo Caballero, the Prime Minister at the time, who promptly told them that the
government could not sign the treaty. Rousset also mentions that there was considerable pressure
on the Spanish Government from France and London who outright hated the treaty.43 This is
further corroborated in Spain: The Unfinished Revolution by Arthur Landis, who writes that
Largo Caballero, along with other government ministers, stated that they would vote down any
such proposal for fear of losing French and British support.44 This ended any real Moroccan
support for the Spanish. The prospect of a rebellion in Morocco was very possible and indeed
could have happened regardless of Republican intervention. Yet the negligence of the
Republican government doomed most of the hope for such a course in the war.
Spanish Eurocentrism and Colonialism
The Republican’s failure to ally with Moroccans was due to their failure to let go of
Eurocentrism. Even the Communists and Socialists of the government, groups of people who
expressed internationalism and anti-imperialism, still clung to racist and chauvinistic attitudes
when it came to the war. As mentioned before, Orwell declared that the government placated
French colonialism and Rousset asserted the exact same thing. However, there are also more
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direct assertions from the French Prime minister at the time, Leon Blum himself. Blum was a
Socialist Prime Minister, elected on a largely Socialist Popular Front government in 1937.
Despite this he feared that any sort of independence or autonomy in Morocco would threaten
French power in the region and in Africa. He pressured the Spanish Government against any
such negotiations, threatening to stop the already small amount of support France and Britain
were giving the Spanish Republic.45 He later cited this as his greatest political failure.46 Despite
the British and French, Spain still could have negotiated with Morocco either way and incited a
revolt. What stopped this from happening was the Republic's obsession with French and English
support in the war. A large reason that the Caballero government placated France was because
they saw France as the only way to win the war through either intervention or military aid. This
belief was a great detriment to the Republicans' cause. France and England were the main
proponents behind a non-intervention policy in Spain stopping any war support or military
intervention on either side of the war.47
England itself was very against any support early on, threatening to break all military ties
with France if France attempted to help the Socialists in Spain.48 This ruined the Republican war
effort severely as it allowed the Fascist side to be aided by Italian and German support while the
Republicans were left with nothing. In some cases, England also concretely supported the
Nationalist side in the war. The Spanish Navy had largely remained loyal to the Spanish
Republic, but because of British interference from Gibraltar, the Spanish Navy was unable to
blockade the introduction of Moroccan Troops to the peninsula.49 In other instances according to
“German sources” at the time, England was supplying munitions to France from Gibraltar on the
onset of the war.50 From this, English support for the Spanish democracy was not just unreliable
it was virtually impossible. The only explanation behind England’s hidden support for Fascism
was that it feared the spread of radical Communism in Europe. The Spanish Left had begun to
implement radical social change throughout the country such as collectivizing factories and
farms as well as expropriating wealth from Capitalists. This frightened England and its
conservative Tory government at the time, pushing it to pull all support for the Republic.
This becomes clearer with the strange involvement of the USSR. The Soviet Union had
given aid to Spain, yet the war support received was extremely small in comparison to the war
support given by Italy and Germany.51 Stalin also wrote directly to Largo Caballero advising him
not to hurt or collectivize any “French Bourgeoisie” property or wealth in the country.52 This
coupled with the Communist Party of Spain’s suppression of more radical elements in the
government showed that the USSR was more worried about how the conflict in Spain would be
perceived rather than who would win it. Indeed, Stalin was more worried about the formation of
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Fascist and Liberal alliances in Europe than he was about who would win in Spain. He feared
that a more Communist victory in Spain would frighten France and England in an alliance
against the Soviet Union.53 Stalin also feared that if the Spanish government fell too quickly,
Fascism would be strongly entrenched in Europe. This is the reason why the Soviet Union gave
aid to the Republic and signaled that it would be its fervent supporter in stopping Fascism despite
not giving substantial aid to the Republic. As such, not only was the Spanish Republic against the
Nationalists aided by Italy and Germany, but even its own supporters in Europe, England,
France, and the Soviet Union had different political aspirations in Spain and maneuvered in such
a way that led to the destruction of the Spanish Republic.
Despite this lack of support and political maneuvering, the Republic still remained loyal
to England, France, and the Soviet Union. They saw the European powers as the only nations
that could save them from Franco and the Nationalists. Although the Republic was a government
made up of radical Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists who professed their internationalism
and anti-colonialism, it was still largely Eurocentric in its views and hopes for revolution. This is
shown in the colonial manner in which Caballero later approached Moroccans. Largo Caballero
was a man described as the “Spanish Lenin'', yet he only saw the Moroccans and their
independence as a secondary matter in the Spanish Revolution. After the first meeting by the
Moroccan Action Committee, Caballero approached Moroccan nationalists again in the hopes of
sparking a revolt. However, he did this without promising any autonomy or independence.
Instead, he merely offered money and treated the Moroccans of the Rif as mercenaries that could
be bought and used for war.54 In other instances, Caballero reportedly tried to sell off part of
Spanish Morocco to win concessions from the French and English.55 Moroccans of the Rif were
largely anti-Franco but the Republic was too tied up into European interests that they could not
see that their real allies were not the French or English but the people of Morocco who wanted to
free themselves from the same Fascism they fought in Spain.
Conclusion
In a 1938 article in New Leader, George Padamore, a famous Pan-Africanist Socialist
theorist, discussed the use of Moroccan troops in the Spanish Civil War. He highlighted the
failure of the Republican government and their policy of continuing Imperialism, noting that
most Moroccans did not particularly agree with Fascism but did so out of economic necessity.56
He argued that if the Republic had done more to help the Moroccans, the Moroccans would not
be fighting for Franco. Padamore also made another argument using the Spanish Civil War as a
lesson to French and British workers. He begins by highlighting the fact that in order to obtain
the colony in Morocco, The Spanish government first suppressed its own people by installing a
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dictatorship and suppressing democracy.57 In order to suppress the tribes of the Rif, the Spanish
workers first had to be suppressed and that this was the price the Spanish people had to “pay for
empire.” Essentially, the Spanish Civil War was the reverse; in order to suppress the people of
Spain, Franco and the Nationalists had to suppress the people of Morocco. Instead of uniting
against the same foe, which was Colonialism, the Spanish instead stuck to Europe. As a result,
not only were they suppressed, but Moroccans would not have independence for another two
decades. He ends his argument by telling workers to beware and that the lesson from the Spanish
Civil War is to show “more solidarity in deeds not in words.”
The lesson is still something that needs to be learned: that movements and causes will
only prevail through solidarity with the oppressed and colonized. The Spanish Republic for all its
revolutionary potential and liberatory social change, was still tied in colonialism and racism.
While the Anarchists of the CNT-FAI and most of the Socialists of Catalonia supported the
prospects of decolonization, the system set up across the Republic was still built on the colonial
system. The fall of the Republic and its failure in the Civil War are hinged on a multitude of
reasons and histories. Yet amongst all the discourse of military tactics, politics, and social
change, there is very little talk about the fact that even as a Republic, Spain was still a colonial
empire. Even less is mentioned about that fact that after most of the government was made up of
Radical Socialists, it was still a colonial empire. The lesson is that even though so many sought a
radical break from the past, they still could not break with the benefits of superiority and
Eurocentrism that was so antithetical to their beliefs. Thus, the real importance of Morocco in the
war was not its weapons, but the fact that it questions what could have happened had the
Republic truly been for freedom, had it decolonized and broken with the Colonial powers.
Perhaps a revolt in Morocco would have completely disrupted the Fascists enough to allow for a
Republican victory. It may have created an independent or autonomous Morocco that could have
sparked further decolonization in the French Colonies. However, none of these potentialities
happened because Spain “paid the price for the empire”. This is a lesson that teaches to this day
that it is always vital for a movement to be intersectional and decolonial if it is to truly liberate
all people.
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Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle:
The Spolia of Late Antique and Early Christian Rome

Jacqueline D. Schwartz
University of California, Santa Barbara

Architecture in Rome often looks like a mosaic; early antique marble chunks lie side by
side with late antique brickwork and medieval stone blocks. This potpourri of material history
can usually be attributed to spolia. The term originally referred to spoils of war, but among
scholars its usage has expanded to any reuse of materials or artifacts.1 From Constantinople to
Reims, evidence of repurposed structures can be seen in countless churches, walls, and
monuments. Rome is arguably the greatest basis for the discussion of spolia; many of its most
iconic sites are made up of a combination of ancient and medieval materials working in tandem.
While there is evidence of material reuse throughout Republican and Imperial Rome, it was
Constantine I who legitimized the practice of spoliation and set a precedent of imperial claim to
existing monuments.2 Later emperors built on Constantine’s foundation and eventually papal
figures adopted the practice. It is important to note that although spoliation often carries the
negative connotations of looting and plunder, it was actually a legal practice is most cases;
legislation compiled by Emperor Theodosius clearly outlined regulations on what could be
repurposed, how it could be presented, and who had the power to do so.3 Theodosius’s
legislation covered the period from the 320s to the 420s, but given the depth and quantity of the
collection it is fair to assume that similar legislation had existed in Rome since Constantine I. In
the time between these two emperors, the use of spolia shifted greatly; many scholars attach a
symbolic purpose to the spolia of emperor Constantine I but attribute Theodosius and his papal
contemporaries' use of spolia to the economic decline of the empire. In this essay I will explore
commonly cited motivations behind the use of spolia in Rome. I will then review specific case
1
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studies, from the Aurelian Wall to the Pantheon. Rather than discuss every instance of spolia in
Rome (I would need a full library for that venture), I will focus on sites that exemplify the
potential pragmatic and symbolic interpretations of spolia that can then be applied to other sites
in Rome and abroad.
Historians have cited pragmatism, triumphalism, heritage preservation, religious
appropriation, historical continuity, civic pride, and the appreciation of classic aesthetic forms as
explanations for the use of spolia in Rome4. However, there is dissent in academic circles on the
reliability of such claims given that most of these symbolic meanings were extracted by modern
historians rather than explicitly written by contemporary Romans. For this reason, I’d like to
review some of the surviving contemporary literature on the uses of spolia. As a large portion of
studied spoliation cases are directly or indirectly related to the creation of churches in the late
antique and early Christian periods, it would be beneficial to include a popular contemporary
theological opinion on spolia. The following quote from 397 CE comes from St. Augustine of
Hippo, a prominent Christian philosopher and father of the church:
As [pagans] for their part make perverse and unjust misuse of [materials] in the service of
demons, so Christians for theirs ought(...) to take these things away from them for the
proper use of preaching the gospel. Their fine raiment too, meaning, that is, what are
indeed their human institutions, but still ones that are suitable for human society, which
we cannot do without in this life, are things that it will be lawful to take over and convert
to Christian use.5
As one of the authors of Christianity itself, it is fair to assume that St. Augustine’s expressed
opinion on spoliation at least slightly reflects the broader Christian viewpoint. With that in mind,
Augustine sees the reuse of pagan objects (columns, capitals, decorations, etc.) as a sort of
material proselytism. He believes that pagans have stained the very structures they created ‘in the
service of demons,’ and it is the duty of Christians to repurpose and thereby cleanse these
structures. Thus, the reuse of temple materials was accepted, even encouraged, in early Christian
Rome as long as it served the objectives of the church. It is also important to note that Augustine
duly praises the ‘fine raiment’ of classic architecture and the convenience that its repurpose
provides, pointing also to a pragmatic motivation behind early Christian spoliation. Along the
same lines is the following excerpt from the poet Prudentius around 410 CE:
Oh noble Romans, (…) let these statues, the works of great craftsmen, stand undefiled;
Let them become the most beautiful adornments of our native city- may no Depraved
purpose taint these works of art, no longer in the service of evil.6
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Again, the association between paganism and ‘the service of evil’ is highlighted; however, rather
than using this juxtaposition to encourage the reuse of pagan structures for the church like
Augustine, Prudentius instead focuses on the aesthetic value of classic architecture. He writes
that once the ‘evil’ association of paganism is stripped, the ‘beautiful’ adornments of the city can
be truly appreciated. Prudentius expresses reverence for the craftsmanship of the classic era
believes it is a defining feature of Rome. Taking St. Augustine’s and Prudentius’s words
together, we can conclude that the religious, pragmatic, and aesthetic motivations behind the use
of spolia were not mutually exclusive and often operated in tandem.
This multi-faceted background helps to explain why spoliation occurred more and more
frequently after Constantine I; the rise of Christianity coupled with the economic and political
decline of Rome left a large demand for the reuse of classic materials, and thus spoliation
reached an all-time peak. Some historians, however, completely reject any notion of meaning
behind spolia and instead approach the practice from a strictly pragmatic perspective.7 It is
simply more cost-effective to reuse columns, capitals, and other frequently spoliated items than
create new ones. If there are entire abandoned temples strewn throughout the city, why not make
them useful? Those who consider pragmatism the primary purpose of spolia often attribute the
rise of spoliation seen in the early Christian era as evidence for and a result of Rome’s decline. A
weakened Rome in need of defense would certainly encourage the rapid reuse of any available
materials; a great example of spolia in this situation is the creation of the Aurelian Wall.
The Aurelian Wall was first built by Emperor Aurelian between 271 and 275 CE to fulfill
the need for an expanded defense system in the wake of the Gaulish threat to Rome.8 To fortify
the city as quickly as possible, efficiency was prioritized. This manifested in two primary
pursuits: the reuse of building materials and the incorporation of pre-existing structures in the
wall. The wall was made of a combination of new and reused brick; pre-Aurelian stamps from
the 2nd C CE found throughout the wall prove that at least a portion of the bricks were sourced
from existing structures.9 Additionally, in later expansions and repairs, large ancient stones
(often from aqueducts) were recut and placed in the wall.10 In this case, the spolia found in the
Aurelian Wall was used for its convenience rather than for its symbolic meaning. Similarly, the
many existing buildings that were incorporated into the wall were meant to speed up construction
and save on resources. Some of the most famous structures found in the wall include the
pyramid-shape Tomb of Gaius Cestius, Castra Praetoria, and the Aqua Anio Novus.11
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Illustration of the Tomb of Gaius Cestius in the Aurelian Wall12
Lanciani estimated that a full one-sixth of the wall was made up of pre-existing structures.13
Consequently, it is fair to conclude that the use of spolia in the Aurelian Wall was much more
about pragmatism than symbolism.
In contrast, in terms of the symbolic use of spolia, there is none more exemplary than the
Arch of Constantine I. To understand the symbolism behind many of the repurposed friezes and
artwork in his arch, it is first necessary to give context for Constantine’s relationship with
Christianity and politics. Although once a dedicated pagan, Constantine had an epiphany in 312
CE that the Christian god would grant him victory over his political enemy, Maxentius.14 His
epiphany came true at the Battle of Milvian Bridge, and he vowed to end the persecution of
Christians in the empire. This left Constantine in a problematic political position; how could he
sustain his profession of Christianity while maintaining the support of the still-pagan elite?
Constantine’s strategy relied on the art of balance. He somehow had to demonstrate a change in
government to legitimize the Christian religion while reassuring the elite that their traditional
position of power was not under threat.
This is where the Arch of Constantine comes into the picture. The dedication of a
triumphal arch would have had vast historic implications for ancient Romans; it was an
immediately recognizable sign of power and victory, and it represented the induction into the
ranks of history’s greatest Roman generals and emperors. In regard to Constantine’s historical
allusions, Elsner states that “the distinction and authority of a new dynasty and a new capital
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were underwritten by an intense visual programme appealing to and rooted in the past”.15 The
‘new dynasty’ element of Constantine’s Arch is provided by the extensive frieze depicting the
Battle of Milvian Bridge; as the first arch dedicated to a civil rather than a foreign war, it
separates Constantine I from the tradition of the past and hints at a different (Christian accepting)
trajectory for the future. To satisfy the need for establishment on the part of the pagan elite,
Constantine I used spolia in the decoration of his triumphal arch to solidify his connection with
the beloved rulers of the past. These reused sections come from monuments dedicated by
Hadrian, Trajan, and Marcus Aurelius.16 These rulers make up three of the “Five Good
Emperors” and the allusions would have been quickly understood by contemporary Romans. On
the west wall of the central opening lies the great Trajanic frieze which was moved from its
original location in the Basilica Ulpia in Trajan’s Forum. The frieze contained a sculpted head of
Trajan, which Constantine had recut to portray his own likeness.

Constantine’s recut face of Trajan17
By literally creating himself in the image of Trajan, Constantine symbolically rendered himself
as the natural successor to the power and prestige attributed to Trajan. Similarly, and to the same
effect, Constantine resculpted the head of Hadrian from the Hadrianic Medallion and multiple
heads of Marcus Aurelius. In addition to symbolically garnering himself the power of these great
emperors, Constantine also uses his chosen spolia to justify his questionable-at-best accession to
emperor. Trajan, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius all protected Rome from foreign invaders; by
adopting scenes depicting these battles in his triumphal arch, Constantine portrays himself as
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protector, rather than the tyrant, of Rome. The Arch of Constantine is the perfect example of the
symbolic potential of spolia; the incorporation of monuments from the past created the
perception of historical continuity and placed Constantine as the natural inheritor of the empire.
Whereas the Arch of Constantine utilized the symbolic power of spolia to align the past
with the present, St. Peter’s Basilica and Saint John Lateran use it to pronounce a separation
from the past and a march towards the Christian world of the future. Also created by
Constantine, these structures, like many early Roman churches, contain spolia in their
decoration. The most commonly reused material in these churches are the columns. In both St.
Peter’s and St. John Lateran, one of the most noticeable features is the variety of columns placed
side by side, ranging in color, size, and material.18

Spolia columns of multiple colors and sizes coexist
in Saint John Lateran.19
This represents a stark departure from the aesthetic tradition of Ancient Rome in which order and
continuity were prioritized; whereas a classic edifice would have required uniform supports and
ornaments, late antique structures often contained a mix of different columns, directly opposing
the classic preference. Brenk argues that Constantine opted intentionally for an eclectic selection
of columns in his basilicas to “obtain varietas,” and curate a non-classical aesthetic using
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“traditional forms… but disconnected from their canonical use.”20 In other words, Constantine
twisted well-defined classic architectural to be recontextualized within a Christian setting. In the
same way that he used established emperors of the past to justify his accession to power in his
arch, in his churches Constantine used established aesthetic forms in a novel format to represent
the beginning of a new age. Both cases rely on the assumed knowledge of the contemporary
audience; if late antique Romans did not grasp the historical framework from whence classic
columns originated, the significance of their reuse in a novel aesthetical form would be lost.
However, given the increase in the frequency of spolia after Constantine, it is safe to assume that
the intended message was indeed transmitted, and transmitted effectively. As I mentioned
previously, recontextualization plays a tremendous role in the symbolic power of spolia; this
phenomenon occurs frequently in the recontextualization of pagan artifacts in Christian contexts,
like the Basilicas of St. Peters and John Lateran.
Another famous example of Christian recontextualization is the Pantheon. It is important
to note that Rome had a unique relationship with the pagan temples within the city compared to
other Roman settlements. In the East, it was not uncommon to see the “fanatical burning of
altars” and “razing of temples” as the empire transitioned away from paganism.21 In Rome,
instead, there was legislation that protected pagan temples for their cultural importance and
classic aesthetics. This represents a relationship that relies less on the destruction of the past and
more on its appreciation, helping to explain the push to recontextualize pagan temples in the
Christian world rather than demolish them. Accordingly, the Pantheon was left relatively
unchanged in its conversion to the Church of Santa Maria ad Martyres under Pope Boniface IV
in 609 CE.22 Contemporary Romans understood the magnificence of the structure; both in unique
size and design, the Pantheon was unparalleled when it came to ancient Roman architectural
ingenuity. The primary modifications to the structure were cosmetic; the pagan altars were
replaced with Christian saints.23
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Spaces that once contained pagan idols were
converted into chapels for Christian saints.24
The recontextualization of the Pantheon aligns with the opinions of St. Augustine and
Prudentius. They supported the conversion of pagan artifacts and temples into the world of
Christianity not only to establish a new Christian order, but also to preserve the original classic
material for its aesthetic and pragmatic benefits.
The multi-purpose explanations for the widespread use of spolia in late antique and early
Christian Rome help to explain the rise of the practice as the empire progressed past its peak.
Although scholars disagree on the exact motivations behind the use of spolia, most occurrences
can be justified with a combination of multiple factors. Whether it be the pragmatic efficiency
of reused materials in the Aurelian Wall or the symbolism-laden artwork on the Arch of
Constantine, spolia played an important role in Rome’s transition from late antiquity to early
Christianity. Contemporary Roman literature illuminates the unique relationship between the
citizens and the ancient urban fabric of Rome; written works of St. Augustine and Prudentius
chronicle the Roman aesthetic appreciation for classic architecture that existed in tandem with
the desire to cleanse the city of its pagan associations. Taken all together, spolia has become a
defining feature of the Roman urban landscape; it has played a defining role in the story of
Rome and exquisitely illustrates the historical coalescence of the Eternal City.
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Performance of Change Through the G.I. Bill
Jillian B. Smith
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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, referred to as the “G.I. Bill,” persists in the
American memory as a monumental act of legislation. The bill welcomed millions of veterans
into the middle class, and many Americans now praise it as a benevolent reward for military
service. Passed unanimously, the G.I. Bill gained broad support despite a conservative backlash
against the New Deal.1 The bill expanded the federal government’s welfare for veterans by
providing low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans, unemployment compensation, and tuition
payments to all World War II veterans.2 Such support illustrated a change in veterans’ legislation
and suggested the federal government sought to celebrate its servicemen.
In reality, the bill preserved existing government responsibilities—a prewar balance of
power, a duty to rehabilitate disabled veterans, and a distinction between veterans and civilians
in legislation. Despite its progressive appearance, the bill did nothing to change the ideology of
veterans’ legislation. The bill’s architects anticipated a postwar need for increased rehabilitation
but acted with pragmatism to protect the economy. The bill sought to limit veterans’ dependence
on the state and maintain the conservative, prewar social contract between the federal
government and veterans, including age-old disparities of race.
The G.I. Bill emerged as a continuation of historic debates over the government’s role in
veterans’ affairs and preserved the duty to provide for disabled veterans. The Bonus March of
1932 revealed destitution among WWI veterans. With the memory of WWI veterans demanding
more support from their government, the federal government used the G.I. Bill as an economic
defense against later protests. As lawmakers approached WWII veterans’ legislation, they
attempted to avoid repeating the politicization of veterans.3
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Between the Civil War and First World War, veterans’ policy focused on politics, not
need. Until WWI, the federal government administered pensions for veterans disabled by war
and their widows.4 These pensions furnished financial support for families rendered unable to
support themselves after service in the war. Civil War veterans’ legislation, enacted in 1862,
assisted men disabled in service to the Union, and the restricted payment continued the
traditional approach to pensions.5 Congress expanded Civil War pensions to include veterans
disabled after service and all surviving veterans by 1890.6
The power of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the largest veterans’ lobby with
over 400,000 members, emerged following the Civil War. 7 The GAR supported its membership
and demanded increased access to pensions, which jeopardized public admiration of veterans. 8
As pensions increased, civilians perceived veterans as burdens who abused tax dollars for
comfort.9 The GAR’s strength derived from its numbers, and as a result, the GAR presented the
federal government with a new constituency that could win elections. It utilized the influence of
its members to gain expanded pensions, guaranteeing legislators the veterans’ vote. Pension
lawyers saw an opportunity to increase their business, and joined forces with the GAR, creating a
powerful lobby to influence veterans’ pension legislation. Thanks to their efforts, the 1879
Arrears of Pension Act expanded pensions to include all Union veterans with disabilities,
regardless of when they were disabled. The Arrears Act announced intentions to lessen
inequitable pension access, a process different across the nation, but in reality, it sought to satisfy
the GAR and pension lawyers.10
The GAR continued to advocate for greater payments. After the Arrears Act, veterans’
legislation morphed into patronage, and congressmen continued to appease the GAR. 11 Civilians
thought such legislation raided the U.S. Treasury, as pensions consumed an ever-increasing
portion of the national budget.12 The public perceived financial support to able-bodied
servicemen as veterans’ greed.13 Legislators avoided excess payments following the corruption
of Civil War pensions, which illustrated a pivot in veterans’ legislation. The idea influenced the
later WWI compensation legislation to redefine why veterans deserved support from national
institutions.14
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Continuous revisions to pension policy revealed lawmakers’ greed. By the end of the 19th
century, pensions constituted almost a fifth of the national budget, further alienating civilians
from veterans.15 In 1924, Congress enacted the World War Adjusted Compensation or “Bonus”
Act. Payments to servicemen embodied the practical consideration of the loss of often higher
domestic wages during the war.16 The bonus payment, delayed for 21 years to allow the
appropriation to mature much like a bond, compensated veterans for lost economic security from
their military service.
The “Bonus” Act intended to avoid the corruption of Civil War pensions that continued
to define beneficiaries. The legislation departed from gratitude and instead responded to lost
income stemming from service. By 1930, however, the onset of the Great Depression introduced
new challenges as many veterans demanded a response to their immediate need. Veterans began
to seek an advance on their bonuses after losing their jobs. Congress refused to act because it was
unable to pay the bonuses until 1945.17 Then Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt argued the
payment to veterans, let alone an advance, would tarnish veterans’ honor; the federal government
avoided immediate payment to veterans to shirk any appearance of corruption.18 Preserving the
original payday may have upheld veterans’ dignity, but it also suggested the federal
government’s loyalty resided with appearances, not the needs of veterans.19
Desperate veterans joined together in the Bonus March of 1932, an organized protest in
Washington D.C., to call for a thirteen-year advance. Congress again rejected their pleas, and the
government responded with tanks and drawn bayonets. It refused to serve its veterans apart from
necessity born of disability.20 While the progressive-era Congress passed the Bonus to assist
veterans with future economic instability, the delayed payment shirked appearances of additional
compensation for service.21 The social contract focused on loss and restricted federal duty to
veterans who could no longer provide for themselves. In an effort to avoid the corruption of Civil
War pensions, lawmakers overcorrected and excluded veterans from social welfare. The
patronage of Civil War pensions tainted monetary displays of gratitude.22 As national leaders
believed broad and immediate financial support fueled the corruption from the Civil War, many
sought to preserve disability as the guardrail to utilizing veterans’ legislation.
Those guardrails widened under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. It
broadened the powers of the federal government through a series of progressive social policies to
help Americans weather the Great Depression. The New Deal revised the social contract between
civilians and their government. FDR claimed the government must take initiative to uplift its
people in a crisis not as a matter of charity but of social obligation.
15

Bennett, When Dreams Came True, 40-41.
Altschuler, The GI Bill, 27.
17
Bennett, When Dreams Came True, 57.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Davis R. B. Ross, Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II (New York City: Columbia
University Press, 1969), 17.
21
Altschuler, The GI Bill, 26-27.
22
Bennett, When Dreams Came True, 61.
16

73

While FDR extended federal support to many underserved communities, he neglected
veterans. The exclusion continued the legacy, championed by the large veterans’ organization,
the American Legion, of separating civilians from veterans in all policy.23 Such separation
attempted to perpetuate veterans’ exceptionalism, which, during the New Deal, came at the
expense of lost welfare benefits.24 Roosevelt continued to believe that social welfare diminished
veterans’ patriotism to a transaction; he thought financial gratitude echoed the corruption of Civil
War pensions.25 As the New Deal extended welfare and support for civilians, the federal
government preserved its traditional social contract for veterans, providing for the disabled
among them.
The onset of the Second World War helped end the Great Depression and provided
Americans with new jobs essential to the war effort. Domestic employment benefitted from
millions of soldiers leaving the job market because servicemen left their jobs for onceunemployed civilians to fill. The postwar economy lacked the capacity to employ returning
veterans, and the Depression fueled fears of an economy too weak for its population. As the war
effort helped the nation recover from the Great Depression, the demobilization of 16 million
unemployed veterans threatened national stability. Without a job waiting for them, veterans
returning home faced unemployment and economic disability whereas civilians kept higherpaying jobs throughout the war.
In response to economic anxiety, national leaders understood that new veterans’
legislation must account for their re-entry in the job market.26 Support for veterans could defend
against the possibility of a second Great Depression. As the widespread unemployment
instigated the Bonus Army’s march on Washington, lawmakers acknowledged veterans’ ability
to organize against the federal government. Having watched unemployed veterans across
Germany and Italy embrace fascism during the Great Depression, the U.S. anticipated the
possibility of populist sympathies among destitute veterans.27 Anxiety about how to keep the
economy afloat and veterans peaceful guided lawmakers to reconsider the nature of veterans’
rehabilitation.28 The G.I. Bill originated from such fears.
Although the restricted definition of the federal government’s obligations to veterans
remained unchanged, veterans’ lobbyists began to challenge the definition of “disabled.” As the
WWI Bonus accounted for loss of a higher-paying job as an economic impairment, the American
Legion began to reimagine who was disabled by their service.29
Seeking more expansive support from the federal government, the Legion broadened its
interpretation of handicap to include mental, educational, and economic impairments resulting
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from service in WWII.30 Claiming wartime service incapacitated all soldiers, the Legion
separated veterans from citizens by demanding that policies treat them as distinct classes and
advocated for the protection of the national wellbeing.31 The separation between veterans and
civilians stemmed from the Legion’s ideal of veterans’ exceptionalism, which served their
membership by suggesting veterans belonged to a social class distinct from ordinary citizens.32
The New Deal never distinguished between the two groups, but veterans’ legislation did,
allowing the Legion to pursue ambitious provisions as lawmakers attempted to compensate
returning soldiers.
The Legion capitalized on anxiety about the economic shocks millions of unemployed
G.I.s could bring. The Legion enlisted newspaper mogul William Randolph Hearst to organize a
public campaign in support of veterans’ legislation. Hearst spread the notion of battle fatigue as a
threat to the nation by suggesting that returning men might be bitter, psychotic, and aggressive.33
Veterans could trigger a return of the Great Depression and they could bring the bloodshed of a
global war home. The Legion used such fears to advocate for their expanded definition of
disabled veterans. The rhetoric suggested that the hardships and trauma of war suffered by
veterans necessitated economic assistance as they readjusted to civilian life.34 Veterans’
legislation became a means to protect the entire nation, not just the returning servicemen.
The G.I. Bill highlighted the Legion’s legislative priorities and excluded the other
veterans’ organizations from the final legislative effort. As the Legion attempted to change the
nature of veterans’ legislation during WWII, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) joined forces
with other veterans’ organizations to oppose new Legion efforts.35 The VFW teamed up with the
Disabled American Veterans, Military Order of the Purple Heart, and Regular Veterans
Association for fear that the Legion’s broad definition of disability from service would distract
legislative attention from physically disabled veterans.36
For its part, the Legion departed from the otherwise-united organizations because it
believed readjustment presented a problem for all veterans.37 With over an eighth of all soldiers
discharged on account of psychological deficiency, often cases of battle fatigue, the Legion
feared veterans would fail to integrate into society.38 War experiences alienated veterans before
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they returned home, and many men felt unable to reconnect with civilian life upon return.39 At
the 1943 American Legion Convention, Governor Prentice Cooper (D-TN) called upon
upcoming legislation to “secure a sound and enduring peacetime,” by creating opportunities for
veterans to seek work and economic security to promote their reintegration into society.40
Departing from other organizations’ calls to protect a limited number of individuals, the Legion
distinguished itself as the lobby that would protect the nation and all of its veterans.
The opposing veterans’ organizations sought legislation specific to disabled veterans
because a more inclusive bill would impede their access to rehabilitation.41 Several organizations
advocated for a bonus for physically disabled veterans. However, Congress rejected action
similar to the failed 1924 Bonus Act.42 Offering an alternative, the Legion presented new ideas
for veterans’ legislation, which provided federal welfare to all veterans. The Legion parted with
all other veterans’ organizations and lead the formulation and passage of the G.I. Bill on its own.
The Legion benefitted from the alignment between their advocacy and the Roosevelt
Administration’s proposals for integrating returning soldiers into the economy. In 1943, the
National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), a progressive research agency within the executive
branch responsible for many New Deal programs, suggested the federal government owed
vocational training and education to veterans to equip them for the postwar economy.43 Since the
NRPB’s solution promoted veterans’ exceptionalism by distinguishing them for such benefits,
the Legion embraced the recommendations.44 The unexpected alignment between major
progressive and conservative voices further illustrated the G.I. Bill as a necessary solution to
impending issues, not an ideological initiative.
Fearful of another Great Depression, FDR pivoted to support increased veterans’
programming. Roosevelt’s endorsement of NRPB suggestions put him at odds with the
conservative leadership in Congress. Conservatives defunded the NRPB in 1943 to avoid a
resurgence of New Deal-styled policies.45 Roosevelt began following the Legion’s advocacy for
veterans’ programming to distance himself from the appearance of seeking increased executive
power.46 The organization possessed a history of conservatism that advocated for individual
liberty, states’ rights, and limited social welfare.47 The Legion maintained friendships with both
the president and Congress, balancing their support for expansive legislation with the traditional
balance of power.
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Building on their electoral success in 1942, resurgent conservatives in Congress wanted
to avoid expanding social welfare programs that strengthened executive power. The Republican
Party platform of 1944 claimed that “four more years of New Deal policy would centralize all
power in the president… subject[ing] every act of every citizen to regulation by his
henchmen.”48 The dissension against expanding the New Deal and FDR’s authority highlighted
the need for conservative support for a veterans’ affairs bill to pass in Congress. The Legion’s
lobbying against the New Deal strengthened their credibility among conservatives. Legion
leadership insisted post-war veterans’ legislation must preserve individual freedom and denounce
wartime federal power.49 Such requirements countered the appearance of federal intrusion on
veterans. The Legion thus emerged as the leader of WWII veterans’ legislation and gathered
support by combining multiple interests to solve the threat of the return of the Great Depression.
As lawmakers began to draft WWII veterans’ legislation, they followed the Legion’s
“G.I. Bill of Rights.” The language, similar to FDR’s “Economic Bill of Rights,” drew
inspiration from his “Four Freedoms” to better appeal to liberals.50 The omnibus bill fulfilled
many of the NRPB recommendations to assist the transition from a wartime to a peacetime
economy. However, the Legion and NRPB acted with different intentions. The Legion sought to
expand federal benefits for all veterans while maintaining a conservative balance of power that
favored states’ rights. The Legion’s approach drew upon the extant commitment to assist men
disabled in wartime service.51 While both the Legion and NRPB advocated increased federal
benefits for returning veterans, the Legion explained federal funding for rehabilitation programs
as rights, not welfare. The Legion tailored their rhetoric to imply veterans remained independent
of the federal government, despite the uniformity of benefits nationwide.
Such rhetoric strengthened conservative endorsement in Congress for the Legion’s
proposals. Just as Civil War pensions provided financial aid for disabled soldiers and the WWI
bonus intended to compensate for lost jobs, the G.I. Bill of Rights included provisions for
economic, educational, and social disabilities accrued during the war.52 The Republican Party
expressed concern regarding the return of the Great Depression at its 1944 convention, arguing
that the assurance of peacetime work and livelihood for veterans was essential “to establishing
liberty at home.”53 The right to work protected Americans by warding off threats of depression
and fascism. Framing such assistance as the right of veterans garnered conservative support
because it depicted federal expansion as limited protection, not boundless intervention.54 The
Legion centered its message on the rights of veterans to calm conservative fears of an expanding
welfare state under FDR’s command.
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While the enumerated rights presented by the Legion mirrored NRPB recommendations,
its rhetorical strategy silenced conservative criticism. In light of the expansion of federal
programs, conservatives pursued a bill that limited veterans’ dependence on the federal
government.55 Public communications explaining these new rights to veterans, such as a
pamphlet from the Army Times entitled “The GI Bill of Rights and How it Works,” emphasized
that the government’s “helping hand” refused to “relieve [veterans] of all responsibility.”56
Similar appeals to personal responsibility earned support from conservatives in Congress. Like
those conservatives, the Legion wanted to prevent FDR from capitalizing on veterans’ legislation
to expand his power. The concept of veterans’ rights, not welfare entitlements, preserved the
individual impetus for veterans to act on their own instead of depending on executive power.57
Both the Legion and NRPB wanted to enlarge veterans’ programs; however, the Legion
focused on the individual veteran and justified broad measures to protect his liberty. The
NRPB’s economy-wide perspective seemed, in the words of Representative Betrad W. Gearhardt
(R-Calif.), to use the plight of veterans “to accomplish their objectives which have to do with
social uplift.”58 Rhetorical appeals to individualism and responsibility continued to assist
returning veterans in their readjustment. However, the G.I. Bill of Rights’ restricted focus limited
its capacity for social reform. The G.I. Bill of Rights, operating under the Legion’s expanded
definition of a disabled veteran, withheld new powers from the federal government. As the G.I.
Bill of Rights maintained continuity among eras of veterans’ legislation, the Legion managed to
unify conservatives and progressives in Congress.
The G.I. Bill’s conception reveals its conservatism, an aspect overlooked by modern
memory. However, the intentions to preserve a pre-war social contract and work within its
limitations highlight how the appearances of government benevolence can misalign with their
reality. The reality of the G.I. Bill relies on a lobby advancing its politics during a time of
anxiety. The Legion capitalized on the need for change but promised to preserve traditional
structures within the government as a justification to win the broad support it needed.
Representative John Rankin (D-Miss.) chaired the World War Veterans’ Committee and
shaped the bill to suit his values. A staunch segregationist, Rankin wanted to continue the social
order abiding by the conventions of Jim Crow in the South. He refused to grant any federal
agency with the power to encroach upon states’ rights.59 Rankin and his Southern allies wrote a
decentralized bill to ensure no agency pursued racial integration. During a House floor debate,
Representative Ted Abernathy (D-Miss.) spoke on behalf of the Southern Democrat faction and
claimed they “[did their] best throughout the bill—…on all possible features—to place all
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authority possible back in the States.”60 Segregationists, led by Rankin, ensured the G.I. Bill
repressed social mobility for Black veterans.
Beyond protecting state implementation of the G.I. Bill, Rankin sought to limit access to
the benefits given to white veterans. Title V of the bill granted unemployed veterans $20 a week
for up to 52 weeks as they looked for jobs.61 As drafted in the House and Senate version, Title V
threatened wage inequality between white and Black veterans.62 Title V granted equal
unemployment compensation regardless of race and allowed Black veterans the time to pursue
higher-paying jobs than the first ones available, which were often as sharecroppers.63 Providing
Black veterans with assistance to uplift themselves from impoverished conditions threatened
white supremacy in the South. Rankin wanted assurance from the Veterans Administration (VA),
which implemented the bill, that it would restrict Black veterans’ access to benefits under Title
V.64 The bill embodied Rankin’s desire to preserve the prewar racial hierarchy in the South. The
Senate passed a liberal version of the G.I. Bill, and Rankin refused to let the House even debate a
bill similar to it.65 Rankin held the bill hostage in an executive session of the House World War
Veterans Committee because he feared Black veterans would abuse Title V to live off the
government or escape economic segregation, a form of de facto segregation by wealth and class
among white and Black veterans.66 As Rankin claimed white veterans would reject “this socalled G.I. Bill” because of its equal treatment of white and Black veterans, he used the
executive session to curb the Black veterans’ access to unemployment compensation.67
After forcing executive revisions, Rankin protected the conservatism inherent in the final
version of the bill. From April 18-May 3, 1944, the World War Veterans’ Committee approached
the bill in private to curb the liberalism within the Senate version of the bill.68 Threatening to
destroy the entire G.I. Bill, Rankin pushed a more conservative draft through his committee to
ensure the bill prevented federal agencies from using it to encroach upon states’ rights.69 The
committee consolidated the administration of the entire bill to one federal agency, the VA, and
left the remaining powers to the states.70 While Rankin achieved a more restrictive Title V in
committee and passed it through the House, he lost it while in conference committee with the
Senate to write the final bill.71 The Legion persuaded Representative John Gibson (D-GA) to
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vote against Rankin’s language, and which extended a concession to the Senate and broke the tie
within the House-Senate conference.72 However, Rankin’s influence pervaded outside Congress.
The Interstate Conference Commission helped write the final language of Title V and worked
with Rankin to grant states interpretive control regarding Title V and according to the
Comptroller General, “most of [its] disqualifying provisions.”73 States reserved the authority to
block access to the breadth of entitlements, and many disqualifications affected Black veterans at
a disproportionate rate.74
Rankin’s leadership of the G.I. Bill before and after its passage prevented Black veterans
from using the bill to advance in society. Pamphlets for Black veterans described Title V as an
opportunity to pursue an attractive job offer.75 On the surface, the G.I. Bill created new
opportunities for economic and social integration. However, states followed Rankin’s lead and
used the bill’s decentralized structure to maintain economic segregation.76 Communications to
veterans, such as a pamphlet entitled “Your ‘G.I. Bill of Rights’” warned veterans that if they
“fail, without cause, to accept suitable work when offered,” states could revoke their
unemployment compensation.77 The language made no distinction between Black and white
veterans but left it to individual caseworkers to evaluate the cause for rejecting job offers. In
such instances, white veterans almost always enjoyed more lenient interpretations when it came
to their decisions over what job to accept. In that way, Rankin’s decentralization of the G.I. Bill
sustained Jim Crow practices across the South.
The VA controlled the federal administration of the bill.78 Endowing the VA with new
jurisdiction over education, housing, loans, and unemployment appeared to expand its power and
strength; however, it lacked the funding and staff to manage such programs. States implemented
the G.I. Bill because the VA lacked the competency to administer it nationwide.79 Rankin, in
private conversations with the VA Director, ensured that the administration preserved
segregation by limiting consultation with other agencies that had progressive agendas.80 Both
Rankin and the Legion supported placing the bill in the VA to ensure their policy preserved the
status quo—whether it be in segregation by race or by civilian and soldier status.81 The Legion
framed their support for the VA in their membership newsletter as a means “to protect veterans
from bureaucracy” and the excessive red tape associated with two agencies working in
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conjunction with each other.82 While the structure ensured minimal bureaucracy, it protected
states’ rights to administer the bill and thereby to maintain the status quo.
Congressional progressives challenged the consolidation under the VA and hoped to give
other federal agencies authority. Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY) led the progressive opposition,
which wanted multiple agencies to oversee G.I. entitlements.83 Wagner advocated making the
G.I. Bill a step toward creating perennial welfare policy by endowing federal agencies with
jurisdiction once granted to the states.84 If the G.I. Bill established a precedent for multiple
agencies to administer education, housing, loan, and unemployment policy, related progressive
legislation would have justification to overrule state policies.85 As Rankin restricted the federal
authority over the G.I. Bill, he ensured later progressive bills must challenge federalist tradition,
which would weaken their viability. The VA continued the social contract between the federal
government and its veterans. While the G.I. Bill created material change for many veterans, the
VA’s control prevented institutional change that uplifted veterans regardless of race.
Together, Rankin and the Legion advocated for the VA to assume the administration of
the bill for the benefit of veterans. The Legion wanted to protect the federal distinction between
veterans and civilians.86 Believing the VA would preserve veterans’ exceptionalism, the Legion
supported the VA’s authority over the G.I. Bill.87 The Legion collaborated with Rankin because
he wanted to streamline benefits for veterans and protect them from superfluous paperwork.88
The alliance between Rankin and the Legion solidified the VA’s control of the bill, and the
progressive wing lost to the combined efforts to secure the G.I. Bill under weak leadership in
Washington.
Despite the legislators’ intentions to revert the economy to its prewar size, the bill
facilitated growth. Veterans used their entitlements to obtain high-paying jobs, houses, and
material comforts.89 The architects of the bill lacked the foresight to anticipate the economic
transformations the bill soon catalyzed.90 Title II, which paid veterans’ tuition for four years at
any college or university that accepted them, kept veterans out of the job market for years as the
economy grew.91 However, with the largest impact, Title II incited the growth of the middle
class.92
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Veterans flocked to colleges and universities across the nation. As Ira D. Scott, chief of
the VA’s Advisement and Guidance Division, advised that “adult education or training” prepare
veterans for “occupational adjustment,” veterans pursued education with practical applications.93
Servicemen sought employment as engineers, doctors, and teachers.94 However, these offers to
join high-paying professions overlooked Black veterans. The VA organized no attempt to
support colleges and universities unable to accommodate the influx of students.95 White schools
often possessed the endowment and faculty to adapt; however, Black Colleges and Universities96
received little financial support from state governments.97 Without similar funding, Black
schools lacked engineering and science departments and failed to expand their capacity for new
students.98 Title II catapulted many white veterans into high-paying jobs, which integrated them
into the middle class.99 However, segregated universities limited Black veterans’ access to
comparable education and resultant employment to white veterans.100
The G.I. Bill’s impacts extended beyond collegiate enrollment. As veterans graduated
college, many bought a house with the loan assistance provided under the G.I. Bill.101 World
War II veterans owned almost half of new houses in the immediate postwar decade.102 Veterans’
usage of their entitlements facilitated the growth of the American middle class, which looked
like an era of prosperity. However, Black universities maintained their prewar enrollment
numbers, and VA caseworkers directed Black veterans to lower-paying jobs than their white
counterparts.103 Black veterans returned home to unequal acceptance into society. The G.I. Bill
sought to reintegrate veterans into the economy and facilitated the segregation of veterans. The
resultant growth in the economy exacerbated the antecedent inequality. The bill’s language
treated all veterans equal; however, individual states, universities, and caseworkers shaped each
veterans’ experience. While the middle class expanded and many white veterans enjoyed its
comforts, Jim Crow pervaded society.
The American economy changed as veterans utilized the G.I. Bill. As men, regardless of
economic class, attended university, white veterans encountered unprecedented social
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mobility.104 However, the gap between white and Black Americans in educational attainment and
economic class grew.105 The G.I. Bill preserved the segregated society veterans left behind.
Veterans utilized the bill’s entitlements, fulfilling the bill’s intention to ward off a second Great
Depression. The federal government continued to compensate “deserving” veterans for their
losses during the war. Black veterans had little educational and economic opportunities before
joining the military; the G.I. Bill afforded them with few opportunities upon return. States
maintained the authority to select members of their privileged classes, which prevented the
federal government from creating the social change the G.I. Bill appeared to create.
The Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 transformed the American economy and
appeared to reward veterans with unprecedented access to the middle class. However, the
conservative formulation of the G.I. Bill of Rights and resultant law ensured more continuity
than change. As the bill maintained the prewar social contract, it solidified the conclusion of the
New Deal. World War II veterans’ legislation coincided with the end of a progressive era and
wielded an opportunity to empower the federal government to extend such politics for years to
come. However, Rankin and the Legion maintained leadership of the bill to steer the legislation
away from a liberal version. The bill’s conservatism influenced how veterans saw themselves in
relation to their government. The G.I. Bill influenced postwar policy by continuing the
conservatism from before FDR’s administration. The G.I. Bill preserved more of the prewar
society than it changed. Despite its appearance of reform, the bill protected the social contract
between veterans and their government.
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Media, Criminal Injustice,
and the Black Freedom Struggle
Erin Turner
Vanderbilt University

Introduction
Since the mid-20th century, media outlets have driven publicity for newsworthy events
and shaped content for their receptive audiences. Commonly, massive movements seek publicity
to attract attention and participation for protests, demonstrations, slogans, and unfortunate
events. For instance, the Black freedom struggle of the 1950s through the 1970s took advantage
of their traumatic narratives of oppression to attract national and international attention. Many
African Americans who experienced dastardly components of a racist criminal justice system
were, in turn, earning respect and power from their freedom-seeking counterparts by
commodifying the emotion that fueled Black liberation efforts.1 Media, therefore, became a tool
for exposing the nation to racist law enforcement and legal action. Ultimately, Black freedom
struggle activists deployed media depictions of their policing, arrest, and imprisonment to be
used as movement publicity, earning increased participation and advancing movement motives
through this subsequent growing interest.
Brief History of Victimization
The flawed criminal justice system inspired African Americans to fight for racial equality
and humanity, and the prison system offered ammunition for a battle against forms of
repression.2 By sharing their stories of imprisonment, activists portrayed victimization, thereby
revealing how state authorities treated them and building a campaign against unfair criminal
justice.3 Unfortunately, African Americans have long been victims of criminality, beginning with
1
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a democratic nation founded on settler colonialism and slavery.4 After the Civil War, the 13th
amendment emancipated enslaved African Americans, but the clause “except as a punishment
for crime” created a modern form of slavery.5 Essentially, the amendment abolished slavery but
created an avenue for arresting and incarcerating Black people on the basis of mild crimes such
as vagrancy to further benefit economic systems.6 White society now controlled Black bodies
and labor through the convict leasing system.7 Convict leasing gave white political figures and
police forces an opportunity to take advantage of Black people and their descendants by
subjecting “criminals” to exploitive work, harsh conditions, sexism, and further demonization by
convict leasing publicity. This “modern form of slavery,” along with disenfranchisement,
reinforced racial segregation in the Southern United States and in the prison system overall. As
decades unfolded, convict leasing became the foundation of an argument for racial injustice as a
means of degradation in the criminal system.
Incarceration Disparity
Arrest and incarceration disparities extend from convict leasing to the post-WWII Black
freedom struggle. State imprisonment of African Americans increased exponentially during the
Civil Rights Movement. In particular, some of the inner-state admission rates, released by six
Southern states with large Black populations in 1964 and 1970, represent a significant portion of
state legislation violations, often relative to segregation and demonstration laws.8 In comparison,
a greater proportion of incarcerated individuals in 1970 were held in city and county jails, or
state prisons as opposed to federal prisons.9 As for state jail admissions, the South, a critical hub
of civil rights activism, admitted 37% of the nation’s jailed population in 1950, 36% in 1960, and
39% in 1970, all disproportionate when compared to other regions and populations of the
country such as the Northern states.10 These incarcerations were largely attributed to civil rights
activism deemed illegal, and could later be used to defend the idea that Black people were jailed
statistically more than any other race.
These trends of racialized incarceration prove that African Americans have been
significantly criminalized parallel to the growth of mass incarceration in America’s prisons.
Between 1950 and 1970, the statistics of disparate racial demonization are partially attributed to
state and regional policing enforced by authorities—who in the South, tended to be connected to
organizations that supported homogenized communities and overrepresentation of people of
4
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color in prisons. For example, Bull Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety in Birmingham,
Alabama during the 1960s, strongly opposed the Black freedom struggle and enforced his white
supremacist ideals despite political responsibilities to protect his citizens.11 Several of these
statistics are comprised of participants in the Black freedom struggle, and their criminalization,
arrests, and imprisonments were heavily represented in media outlets. They used a combination
of media and prison to expose their injustices and daily repression, despite some organizations
who viewed purposeful submission to criminal injustice as contribution to this disparity.
Policing Methodology and Peaceful Response
Based on the theory of governmentality, state and local policing methods are
implemented by federal regulations which should be interchangeable and imposed upon citizens
equally. State policies, however, are shaped “around a population whose bodies, distinguished by
race, poverty, and disease, serve as the basis of exclusion.”12 They are also founded in national
policies but are primarily determined by the perceived threat of a movement based on a culture
of exclusion. For instance, the civil rights activism threatened white people in positions of
power, such as the police force who reacted to activists with brutal retaliation of imprisonment
and abuse.
Through a process coined “revitalization projects,” the South aimed to either hold onto
“old south” ideas of marginalization and criminalization of African Americans or introduce “new
south” methods of policing such as surveillance and individual non-intimidating arrests in an
attempt to gain both cultural and financial favors from the North.13 Representatively, the police
force and Chief Laurie Pritchett of Albany noticed that many renowned civil rights activists
created resistance grounded in “stereotypical southern violence” which meant that “new south”
revitalization with nonviolent policing would defeat the premise of this activism.14 Locations
such as Birmingham and Selma that continued to implement containment practices, which were
supposed to keep the activism at bay, instead provided political ammunition to the movement in
favor of racial equality.15 This “police power,” intended to regulate moral life, capital, and other
sociological factors alongside criminality, inspired a comparatively calm response from
activists.16
In response to police brutality, several branches of the Black freedom struggle functioned
on principles of civil disobedience which, according to Martin Luther King Jr., is polite counter11
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friction that resists governmental slavery.17 Later, in the late-1960s and 1970s, the Black Power
Movement, an extension of civil rights activism that sought a new approach to fighting racism,
also included some non-violent approaches, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party. Each of these exhibitions of polite resistance
were inevitably breaking laws and gaining attention for their nonnormative actions. In turn,
media coverage of their leaders’ arrests, policing, or imprisonment proved to be a beneficial
political tactic. Exploitation of the humiliating events brought on by police response to civil
activism was a common theme in Movement media releases to gain attention and sympathy from
readers.
Carefully Selected Activists
In order to analyze how publicity impacted the outcome of the overall Black freedom
struggle, historians must first understand several popular narratives of arrest, which were
commonly publicized in the aforementioned media releases. At the beginning of his political
mission, Martin Luther King Jr., a symbol of civil disobedience and member of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), began the Montgomery Bus
Boycott for thirteen months as a form of protest against racial segregation on buses in the Deep
South. African Americans stopped riding the buses; instead, they either walked or carpooled in
cabs, thereby waging an economic boycott that imperiled state and local transportation systems.
In favor of the boycott, Rosa Parks sacrificed herself to the law by refusing to move out of her
seat for a white person, thus submitting to arrest on December 1, 1955. She was chosen by the
grassroots movement for her quiet and calm demeanor, fully aware that her actions would result
in legal trouble and national publicity.18 According to her police report, she was charged by
“chapter six section eleven of the Montgomery City Code” which addressed mandatory
segregated seating on public transportation.19 After some time in jail, a five-minute hearing, and
a charge of $10, Parks was released. Suddenly, her arrest became a symbol of repression and her
publicity ignited the movement. Her contribution was empowering through pride in her own race
and loyalty to the concept of equal rights, but her inevitable punishment and criminal record
were exploited for betterment of the movement.
Newspaper articles published stories of the boycott’s success such as The Pittsburgh
Courier’s headline “Bus Boycott Effective in Dixie City” which drew Northerners’ attention to a
movement that kicked off with the arrest of a Black woman.20 Further, The Montgomery
Advertiser published an article on December 6, 1955 titled “5,000 At Meeting Outline Boycott;
Bullet Clips Bus” in which author Joe Azbell summarizes the events of Parks’ arrest, 90%
17
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participation by Black people in the boycott, and a defining moment in the movement’s
trajectory. He captures the referenced meeting’s minutes by describing how Martin Luther King
Jr. brought Rosa Parks and Fred Daniel, two recently arrested participants, in front of an
audience and tagged them “tools of justice” who would serve as unifying figures of obtaining
civil rights. 21 All three figures represent activists’ purposeful appearance in the media.
Many African Americans, such as Rosa Parks, who participated in the boycott willingly
risked their run-ins with the criminal justice system. They were aware that their actions would
have legal consequences and subsequent media depictions that created momentum for movement
interest and participation. This knowledge suggests that they were prepared for exploitation of
their crimes. Parks was the first person within the boycott to become a common headliner and
her actions were followed by publication pictures of the aforementioned meeting captioned
“Negroes to Continue Boycott.”22 These pictures and captions describing 5,000 attendees
evidenced growing interest in the cause through enumerating bodies. The St. Louis Dispatch later
released a picture of four prominent boycott “religious and political leaders…after their arrest on
indictments growing out of the bus boycott.”23 On January 26, 1956 Martin Luther King Jr. was
arrested and imprisoned for approximately six months as law enforcement attempted to strike
fear into boycotters and suppress the movement. Rather than stop the boycott, vehement
reactions against King’s imprisonment, in addition to a significant drop in public transportation
funds, led directly to integration of buses in Montgomery, of which King was one of the first
passengers.
Despite his successes and presidency of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), King’s continuous activism came with several more arrests and instances of public and
police brutality. He was sentenced to four months in jail in 1960 for participation in a sit-in,
arrested in 1961 for picketing without a permit in response to a Congress on Racial Equality
(CORE) interstate Freedom Ride, arrested in 1962 for leading a march in Georgia and again for a
prayer vigil, jailed in 1963 for not having a permit in Birmingham, arrested in 1964 for
protesting in St. Augustine, arrested in 1965 for voting rights activism in Selma, stoned in 1966
during a march in Chicago, imprisoned in 1967 for lack of permit again in Birmingham which
resulted in creation of the Poor People’s Campaign, and murdered in 1968 during a sanitation
workers strike in Memphis—all publicized.24 He clearly contributed much to the Black freedom
struggle in terms of his own arrests, imprisonments, public appearances, and exploitative
representation in the media. He was, additionally, a symbol of Black pride and empowerment
through these various acts of bravery against a racist justice system.
Although King is often accredited with much of the struggle’s accomplishments based on
exercised civil disobedience, other prominent figures suffered the effects of policing in order to
publicize repression and advertise civil rights campaigns. For example, in 1961 Hellen O’Neal
21

Joe Azbell, "5,000 At Meeting Outline Boycott; Bullet Clips Bus." Montgomery Advertiser, December 6, 1955.
"Negroes to Continue Boycott," The Montgomery Advertiser, December 6, 1955.
23
"Figures in Alabama Bus Boycott," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 23, 1956.
24
"The King Years," The King Years - a Timeline of Martin Luther King, Jr. | King Legacy Series. Accessed March
25, 2019. http://www.thekinglegacy.org/content/king-years.
22

90

McCray, Diane Nash, and Joan Trumpauer Mulholland, along with SNCC activist Stokely
Carmichael, were just a few Freedom Riders supported by SNCC and CORE who rode interstate
buses as a challenge to the segregation imposed upon public transportation in the South. All were
jailed for their deliberate disobedience and their testimonies drew attention to both “separate but
equal” inequalities and law enforcement responses.25 In 1962, Fannie Lou Hamer, leader of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, and her counterparts were arrested for attempting to
register to vote in Indianola; her gruesome testimony shared at the Democratic National
Convention advertised the abuse she suffered in jail and made her relatable to countless other
African Americans who suffered similar fates.26 These narratives of the Black freedom struggle
were plastered all over national news and radio, either shaping the figures into blameless victims
of racism or dangerous menaces to society—both which garnered interest and attraction to the
struggle.
Power in Numbers
In addition to individual truths of indictment, many activists were arrested or beaten en
masse. Coverage of major events earned more media attention than singular situations because
the drama of large numbers and angry responses drew interest. For instance, in an article
published by The New York Times on July 16, 1964 entitled “Mississippi Jails 106 Court
Pickets,” author Claude Sitton describes the arrest of 106 court picketers at a mass voter
registration event in Greenwood, Mississippi. Headlines that emphasized mass arrests
contributed attention to the civil rights cause, in this case gaining voter registration access in
response to a voting bill, and containment as a method of policing and controlling civil rights
activism. These picketers were reportedly placed under arrest “kicking and screaming” by
gunpoint and abuse, again receiving reader attention and affect.27 Other New York Times articles
include “472 are arrested in Jackson March; 5 Charge Beating”28 about pickets of a legislation
meeting and “Plea to Free Rights Group Is Filed in Federal Court” covering protest of voter
registration restrictions.29 Through the terrifying and encompassing language used in these
national publications, and articles that spoke of massive crowds of Black and white bystanders,
activists became the victims of exploitative African American criminalization while
simultaneously gaining empowering publicity for the fight for Black freedom.
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Language Implications
This publicity was supposed to create discontent with the inherent racism focalized in the
South as well as support of efforts to combat disparity and inequality. Depending on
geographical location and sociocultural space, media coverage catered to varying audiences.
Southern newspaper article authors tended to use harsh language, emotional photographs, and
hardly objective perspectives. In an op-ed article from The Montgomery Advertiser entitled
“Some Observations On The Bus Boycott,” the author writes “It is a proud tradition of this old
city…that nowhere else in the country are the relations between different breeds and creeds so
gentle, easy, and benign,” but concedes that grievances of the African American community
should be recognized because “evolution in oldtime custom and usage” is to be expected. By
calling citizens “different breeds” the author is publishing racist language that dehumanizes
people of color.30 In an article entitled “Mississippi Jails 106 Court Pickets,” author Sitton
explains that white people were primarily kept away from the scene except for “a fat, sloppily
dressed man of middle-age” who violently reacted to an FBI agent attempting to film the arrests,
likely as a method of surveillance and law enforcement review.31 Despite gruesome language
describing the brutality of some arrests, Sitton managed to write through the lens of discontent
with the activists’ actions. His implications suggest that white supporters of the Black freedom
struggle were involved in a battle where they did not belong; his beliefs were echoed by
Southern Dixiecrats who rejected the participation of white people in the Black liberation efforts,
such as the Freedom Rides, where white and Black people alike were beaten for their civil
disobedience.32 However racist or subjective these authors exhibited themselves to be, others
depicted the events with intent to gain sympathy for the atrocity of particular movement
moments. As more outlets took advantage of racist moments, whether racist themselves or not,
more empowerment and added attention were received by the movement for racial equality.
The Black freedom struggle was often paired with police brutality, acts of retaliation by
the public, and assassination of the very figures who spoke as sufferers of racism both within
society and the prison. In Alabama, after 16th Street Baptist Church was bombed, killing four
innocent African American girls in the basement, newspapers released headlines such as
“Birmingham Pays Homage to Its Four Young Martyrs” with pictures of the young victims.33
The article was geared to console activists who continued to protest in the name of lives lost in
the fight. Similarly, when King was suddenly assassinated in Memphis, The Chicago Tribune
read “Martin Luther King Slain” which paid respects to King’s faithful service to the movement
and depicted his murder as motive for his followers to mourn and then move on.34 The language
authors chose ultimately impacted the response of their readers. After reading summaries of mass
incarcerations, cruel policing, or murder, readers were bound to feel sympathy or shock—unless
30
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they considered the events to be justified. With every type of reaction, the movement
successfully acquired more attention and interest composed of both pity and rage.
Inner-Movement Media
Media from within the Black freedom struggle also increased participation and peaked
interest by disseminating the goals and guidelines of individual activist groups. Some
publications from within the movement for Black liberation were released amidst the
reinterpretation of civil disobedience, termed Black Power, when activists began to use prison as
the focal point of contention.35 Although the Black Power Movement occurred later than the
Civil Rights Movement, it clearly represented publications released from within a segment of the
Black freedom struggle that were geared to maintain informative participation. For instance,
based on David Snow’s theory of frame alignment and analyses of social movement participants,
the Black Panther Party used a Ten-Point Program, often on fliers or in handbooks, to connect
inherently racist legal action to behavioral expectations of Black Panthers. Point seven calls for
an “end to police brutality and murder of Black people” and elaborates that Black persons should
be armed in the event of a need for self-defense.36 Further, when leaders of the organization were
arrested or imprisoned, the program publicized these incarcerations and became increasingly
relevant through the real-world examples of the claims made in Party publications.
Other organizations, such as SNCC, released monthly national chapter newsletters to
update readers on progress, publish editorials by activists, and provide an outlet of expression for
African American authors. One archived copy includes a political cartoon featuring John D.
Rockefeller and the Chase Manhattan Bank as they oppress their Black employees. It also
includes a cover story about H. Rap Brown, the founder of an alliance between SNCC and the
Black Panther Party surveilled and arrested for carrying a gun across state lines.37 This
publication serves as an example of the bridge between different Black freedom struggle
organizations who effectively used media as a tool for increasing attention and participation.
The audience of these aforementioned inner-movement publications, relative to the
criminal justice system, was comprised of both Black liberation activists and their enemies.
Some observers, such as the Ku Klux Klan, used these publications as an inside scoop to the
activism so they could respond with protests, riots, and violence. Others, such as Freedom Riders
who joined the rides from less racist locations such as Spokane, Washington or New York City,
did so after a group of imprisoned Nashville students released a statement calling for assistance
in filling up the Parchment Penitentiary. This was a publicity tactic to convince the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to respond with fair busing legislation, which ultimately proved
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successful.38 Overall, the media releases increased participation and attention to the Black
freedom struggle by strengthening members of various organizations, calling for sympathizers to
join, and unintentionally informing opposing forces of unsanctioned events.
Intentionality
Another component of the Black freedom struggle was the careful selection process used
to create famous activists who would be quickly and widely traced by the media. For example,
Rosa Parks was chosen by the grassroots movement to become a “symbol of the mistreatment of
African American women in the segregated South,” and she, as expected, had her face and court
case plastered all over national newspapers and newscasts.39 She was chosen on “politics of
respectability” because the movement predicted that her arrest would be publicized. Her
demeanor was calm and easy-going.40 According to the Women’s Political Council and NAACP,
“Parks’ image in the Black community…made her a person upon whom they believed they could
base their protest.”41 Similarly, Martin Luther King Jr. had a history of preaching that made him
the perfect candidate to give speeches, lead movements, and become a renowned public figure.
Further, he often paralleled his extreme disobedience to Jesus, an “extremist of love.”42 King’s
arrogance and compassion were appealing, evidenced by the Freedom Riders who rejected his
refusal to join the rides but never lost respect for him.43
Movement calculations extended beyond these individual symbols. Julian Bond, a
member of SNCC and insider on the Freedom Rides explains that the riders took advantage of a
contradiction within the Civil Rights Movement: “On the one hand, it’s nonviolent…on the other
hand they’re courting violence in order to attract publicity that will forward the cause.”44 The
response expected from the Rides—including public rejection, rioting, and imprisonment for
violations of segregation laws—was intentionally heated to draw public attention, both nationally
and internationally as evidenced by American and Czechoslovakian dateline topics in a Freedom
Riders documentary.
The same public response was anticipated with the March on Washington. An Alabama
Journal headline read “Police in Washington Worried By Reports Of Negro March Plan” which
portrayed the fear of turnout and loss of crowd control and containment expected at the march.45
Two years after the March on Washington, John Lewis and Hosea Williams attempted to lead a
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group of approximately six hundred people in one of three marches, traveling from Selma to
Montgomery. However, the demonstrators were brutally policed by state troopers while calmly
crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The results of this law enforcement-imposed abuse were
captured in several photos of bleeding, tear-gassed, beaten individuals knocked down for their
attempt at nonviolent protest.46 These photos, commonly captioned “Bloody Sunday” which
became the unfortunate name for the marches, drew international support for the overall
movement which demonstrates how activists used violence, policing, arrests, and incarceration in
media to spread their truth of criminalization.
Inner-Prison
Inner-prison experiences and advertisements released by imprisoned activists were also
influential on public responses and the movement’s attention. For instance, Martin Luther King
Jr.’s famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail” encapsulates the concepts of civil disobedience,
unjust laws, Christian values, and corruption within African Americans’ material reality and
notions of humanity. He writes, “We know through painful experience that freedom is never
voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”47 With his calls for
nonviolent protest based on the discrimination and injustice faced by people of color, King calls
for participation in the movement similar to the vivacity already shown by white people who
“have languished in filthy roach-infested hails, suffering the abuse and brutality of angry
policeman” and Black people who took the brunt of segregation.48 His powerful rhetoric
becomes wide-spread and highly influential on the movement, partially because it was written
within the walls of oppressive confinement. He commonly used rhetoric that was impactful,
long-lasting, and highly played by the media, also evidenced by the fame and quotability of his
“I Have a Dream” speech. He was a powerful, influential individual working to empower
movement followers.
Post-Imprisonment
As an extension of inner-prison correspondence, post-prison narratives also contributed
attention to Black liberation attempts. Fannie Lou Hamer shared her grisly story in an eightminute testimony at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in 1964. After her
attempt at voter registration, Hamer was arrested and incarcerated where she was left alone in a
cell with several men—white and Black—who beat her and left “severe bruises and massive
hematoma of (her) buttocks” according to her medical record.49 She presses her audience by
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firmly asking, “Is this America…where we have to sleep with our telephones off the hooks
because our lives be threatened daily?”50 Hamer’s description of the torture she endured while
imprisoned for mere days after her decision to try to raise above a second-class citizen label left
a mark on her listeners. Her message from within the cell signified injustice of the prison system
as well as inspiration for stronger civil rights resistance.
Similarly, the diary entries released by Freedom Riders, such as Joan Trumpauer
Mulholland who was jailed in the infamous Parchment Prison during the “fill the prison”
escalades, were indicative of any “monotony” or brutality happening within the walls.51 Further,
Diane Nash reveals in a recount of her short prison experience, which was imposed after she
turned herself in, that she “desperately wanted to prepare a press release…for movement people
explaining the necessity for my surrendering and serving the sentence…Staying in jail focuses
attention on the injustice.”52 Therefore, some of the inner-prison and post-prison testimonies
shared by incarcerated activists were a ploy to suffer the injustices, speak from within confines to
make a point to other activists, and advertise racism—particularly in media—as calculated
demonstrations unfolded.
Whether their personal accounts were summarized by growing inspiration or
disappointment with the carceral state, Black freedom struggle activists used these narratives to
shape movement interest. Zoe Colley, author of Ain’t Scared of Your Jail which analyzes these
testimonies in relation to the overall movement, writes, “They turned the jail into a physical and
symbolic battleground for the movement,” which can be traced through contextual evidence of
the movement and “evolution of attitudes toward arrest and imprisonment within the civil rights
movement.”53 For example, planned protests such as the Freedom Rides in the early 1960s
represented a shift from sit-in demonstrations to “jail-in” protests where prisoners refused bail
and chose incarceration.54 They were deliberately allowing exploitation of their suffering to
benefit the movement through attention to unheard of acts.
However, some civil rights organizations viewed filling the jails to be an erasure of the
sacrifices, money, and work that had already been done. The NAACP, for instance, fought to
break the disparity of policing and imprisonment for African Americans and feared that
willingness to submit to jailing would be nothing more than “a social stigma.”55 According to
several activists, such as protestors in the Freedom Summer of 1964, becoming a part of the
prison system allowed them to review the definition of criminality. This definition was
inherently skewed by the criminal justice system but determined by other incarcerated
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individuals and defined by the charges pressed against the activists.56 Prison protests remained
fairly subtle and directed toward law enforcement practices such as undeserved beatings or
arrests until some members of the Black freedom struggle gained a stronger interest in prison
reform, police brutality, and justice. At this point in the 1960s, activism morphed into “Black
power” rhetoric that included “armed self-defense, political empowerment, economic
independence, Black separatism, racial pride and antiwhite sentiment.”57
The Black Power movement, created by the 27-times-arrested SNCC leader Stokely
Carmichael in the late 1960s, used the carceral state as a tool for publicity and momentum for the
Civil Rights Movement. Black Power activists “made opposition to state repression in the form
of policing and imprisonment a fundamental ingredient of political struggle” through their selfdefense campaigns and willingness to be incarcerated.58 They noticed that prisons and jails were
a form of suppressing seemingly radical ideas of equal rights and desegregation within the
southern Civil Rights Movement and expanded it to include more urban areas with a new,
militarized response. So, although prideful incarceration is significantly and concretely
evidenced by the Black Power movement, Black freedom activists under the terms of civil
disobedience and nonviolence began the trend. Dan Berger, author of Captive Nation, echoes this
sentiment as he writes, “Their entanglements with the most dreaded southern institutions
facilitated their ideas that race and freedom were grounded in a carceral experience.”59
Confirming the connection between civil rights and Black liberation, in Prison Power,
Lisa Corrigan analyzes the use of prison rhetoric and organizing to explain the transcendence of
the movements by suggesting, “prison became the critical space for the transformation from civil
rights to Black Power.”60 Further, activists were forced to consider flaws of the implementation
of civil disobedience, instead searching for new approaches to shaping depictions of imprisoned
activists and the movement’s overall intentions. So, “violence became a large part of the
conversation as (mostly) white media outlets pushed back against a more radical civil rights
agenda.”61 Regardless of the vivacity with which media responded to the movement’s rhetoric,
both civil rights and Black Power activists took advantage of discrimination within policing and
imprisonment to expose their repression and build interest. Their stories became the basis for
headlines regarding the Black freedom struggle as they battled oppression with prison as the
weapon of choice.
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Legislative Responses
Amidst all of this media-shaped civil rights action, the U.S. government took steps
toward racial equality in response to the movement. In 1964, they passed the Civil Rights Act to
end segregation of public places and discrimination of hiring practices for the labor sector. One
year later, the Voting Rights Act was passed to allow African Americans a chance at voter
registration and elections. Despite the policy changes in the 1960s, society had trouble digesting
the new laws and acting accordingly. Consequently, prisons and jails were still
disproportionately filled with more African Americans than white people, and some of those
individuals were activists. After achieving civil rights laws, some civil rights activists considered
the journey to be over. However, others understood that the war was not won, and the fight
turned into a search for liberation in addition to pride and humanity—the agenda of the Black
Power Movement. Through the next few decades, legislation was implemented with more
accuracy, and milestones were met on account of civil rights activism, but incarceration and
criminalization did not disappear in the slightest. In contemporary society, mass incarceration is
greatly representative of a racialized criminal justice system that deems one race superior to
others.62 Despite shortfalls of the movement as a whole, the Black freedom struggle and Black
liberation were directly shaped by exploitative and empowering media mixed with policing,
arrests, and imprisonment.
Conclusion
In the fight for freedom and equality, African Americans were often criminalized and
demonized through arrests as a method of creating a divide between first and second-class
citizens. Racism triumphed through the disparity and rise of incarceration, but the Black freedom
struggle gained traction through media releases and coverage of activist victimization within
calculated resistance. Media often focused on massive demonstrations, blatant disobedience of
racist legislation that led to arrests or police brutality, central figures of the movement who were
deemed popular and respectable, and heart-breaking testimonies of individuals directly impacted
by the enemy of the movement: racism. As activists discovered the impact of using prison and
policing to gain more attention, the movement developed, and their intentions transformed from
complacency with civil disobedience to self-defense and nationalist-based rhetoric. As the
movement progressed and discovered new media approaches that caught attention for activists,
the public responded appropriately and contributed to the movement with interest and
participation. Continued research could potentially reveal modern forms of media used to attract
movement interested to battle incarceration and forms of oppression.
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Chapter Two: The Transition
On October 5, 1988 a national referendum was held in Chile to decide if the ruling
military regime of Augusto Pinochet would be extended yet another eight years. Young and old
alike filled the street distributing pamphlets with voting directions and information; flyers papers
all over Santiago read “NO,” a reference to the vote against Pinochet. Not only did those
publicizing the referendum have to work against a confusing ballot where a negative answer
meant a positive outcome, but they also had to convince citizens that they wouldn’t be subject to
terrorism and intimidation by the government when they showed up at the polls. Yet, despite the
uphill battle, the NO campaign won with a 53% vote.1 Not quite ready to lose the long game,
Pinochet met with other members of the junta to discuss the action they might take in response to
the vote. According to reports, it was in this meeting on the evening of the plebiscite that he
suggested a violent overthrow of the vote and a reinstatement of the coup.2 However, with
growing pressure from international powers due to the many human rights violations published
by the Vicaria de Solidaridad, as well as this standing promise of a fair election, members of the
junta turned against Pinochet’s plan to violently retain power. The referendum had been allowed,
and thus it had to be followed through. Over the course of the next year, Augusto Pinochet and
his military dictatorship would be phased out of the Chilean government. For the first time in
fifteen years, the Chilean people would be allowed to elect their leader. For many, this was the
beginning of an era free of repression, a restoration of agency and community in the absence of
terror. For the Chilean Catholic Church, however, this was a moment of crisis. Political
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liberation also meant social liberation, and combined with the legacy of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad’s ability to create resistance within institutions themselves, leaders in the Church
began to fear they would lose their hold on the Chilean people. As a reaction to the changing
political landscape, conservative Church leaders began the transitioning the structural makeup of
the Church, putting the spiritual and political power back into the hands of the clergy.
This chapter’s focus is on this moment of change. In covering the cruelty of the military
junta, and the Church’s resistance as a response, we have established the stakes of this political
moment as one of deep emotion for the Chilean people. In order to know and explore this
emotion, it is important to understand the mechanisms behind the change itself. This chapter will
address historiography and various academic readings of this transition, as well as trace the
actions of main players and the broader nature of Chile in the nineties. The main argument calls
into question the motives of Church leaders and ties it to the consequences of their actions. The
active and successful resistance of the Catholic Church in Chile through the Vicaria, and the
increased presence of liberation theology in Latin America, created an imminent threat to the
hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. Where leftist ideologies promoted communitybased organizing and solidarity, the Catholic Church pushed hierarchy and religious obedience.
The ability of the Chilean Church to occupy the role of religious leadership while also providing
aid and sanctuary against a conservative military regime placed them in a precarious position
with various Church leaders. Even if the Chilean Church itself was not a leftist political force,
their opposition to Pinochet’s repression as well as the human rights violations generally
disregarded by the Vatican made them a thorn in the side of both parties. However, there was no
doubt that the work of the Vicaria was indeed beneficial for the public image of the Vatican, and
thus rejecting it or even attempting to close it down under the regime would have incited
international chastisement; Pinochet knew this as well as the conservative forces in the Church.
Instead, the strategic move was to await the re-introduction of democracy to Chile, and then
declare the Vicaria and its community counterparts unnecessary to the development of a healthy
democracy.
Academic coverage of this historic moment is ample, however there are various readings
and arguments as to why and how this transition of political and religious power occurred. Liesl
Haas authored a chapter entitled “The Catholic Church in Chile: New Political Alliances” in the
collection Latin American Religion in Motion. In this chapter she identifies the end of the
dictatorship as a time of crisis for the Catholic Church and acknowledges the subsequent switch
from progressive human rights advocacy to conservative preoccupation with social morals. Since
the Catholic Church has historically held socially conservative views around abortion, marriage,
and so on, the post-dictatorship era switched their concern from human rights to keeping hold of
the morality of their diocese.3 As a result, many of the homilies and teachings turned from
encouraging community solidarity to upholding many right-wing political perspectives.
According to Haas, the Church didn’t necessarily lose those social views when the coup occurred
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in 1973, they just became a second priority to the defense of human rights. While much of Haas’
interpretation follows through with historical analysis, her implication that the foundation of the
Church remained unchanged fails to acknowledge the historical context of liberation theology, as
well as the dissolution of the Vicaria de Solidaridad. To view the changing political alignment of
the Church as “ironic” in light of its progressive history, and to see these changes as secondary
factors to a preoccupation with social morals, is to ultimately overlook the legacy of the Catholic
Church’s engagement and interest in maintaining political power.4 There was indeed a concern
over a newly realized social liberation, and this no doubt contributed to the Church’s turnover,
but it was a revival. Pope John Paul II’s papacy was famous for its desire to reestablish Church
power in hierarchy, and Chile’s Church seized the end of the dictatorship as a time to fall in line
with the Pope’s new agenda.5 The end of dictatorship coincided with the end of the Cold War,
and the Catholic Church was doing its best to move away from this era of progressive religious
rhetoric.
Cristian Parker puts forth a similar argument in his chapter on religion and culture in
Chile in the Nineties. For Parker, “Democracy proposed not only the transformation of the State,
but also the liberalization of culture.”6 This, he argues, was a catalyst for the Catholic Church to
increase their hold over the social and moral aspects of religious life. Like Haas, Parker excludes
that the Church was already beginning to tighten controls under Fresno’s leadership, and that
liberation theology’s prevalence under the regime directly threatened the hierarchical control of
the Church. The Church certainly made its public statements for a return to social conservatism
in relation to the liberal promises of democracy, however their previous actions and organizing
away from the laity made it clear this change had ulterior motivations. Another argument that
Parker puts forth, which is a common framing, is that the decrease of religious importance in
daily life was a result of democracy itself.7 This argument posits democracy as a modern form of
governance, and so with modernity comes a decreased interest, or loyalty, to religion. This
argument requires too many assumptions to be taken as historically viable. It assumes that
democracy is the highest evolved form of government, and additionally that religion fills some
primitive function in a distraught society. It also assumes that progress happens linearly; that
today we are more progressed than our ancestors before us. However, there is no high or evolved
form of society, and such an assumption is Western-centric thought. It is also incredibly
condescending to assume that religion is a need that melts away once modernity, which remains
undefined by Parker, presents itself. Besides the broader historical problems of Parker’s
argument, in the Chilean context it also overlooks the actions of the Church. The decision of the
Church to push towards conservatism in order to retake its stronghold on Chilean society had a
Haas, “The Catholic Church in Chile,” pp. 51.
James Martin, “Opus Dei In the United States.” America- The National Catholic Weekly. America Press, February
25, 1995. https://web.archive.org/web/20090116173841/http://www.americamagazine.org/content/articles/martinopusdei.cfm.
6
Cristián Toloza, Eugenio Lahera, Michael A. Keller, and Roberto G. Trujillo. Chile in the Nineties. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Libraries (Publisher, Michael A. Keller), 2000, pp. 638.
7
Ibid pp. 640.
4
5

105

direct impact on religious participation. By attempting to negotiate with the regime, taking more
conservative positions on social organizing, and eventually dissolving the Vicaria de Solidaridad,
the Church effectively alienated the majority of its base. The consequences of these actions can
be seen to develop slowly over time, as different communities filtered out religion from their
lives once it became clear the Church no longer represented them in their poverty and struggle.
Thus, the documented decrease of religious participation in Chilean society at the end of the
twentieth century was a direct result of the Church’s actions, and not a consequence of the
introduction of democracy.
Michael Fleet and Brian Smith’s research confirms the decrease of Catholic participation,
but also delves into the personal and political outlooks of Chileans in order to assess their
motivations in turning away from the Church. They argue that the institutional Church had great
impact and influence over the transition into democracy, but members of the Church did not.
They also acknowledge that such a transition began much earlier than the 1988 plebiscite,
especially for the Church.8 When looking into changing ideology in Chile, they surveyed
Chileans and recorded their political affiliations and opinions regarding the government. They
found that most low-income members of the Church, especially those involved in activism, had
progressive views, though not excessively left. However, they point out “the openness of these
low-income Catholics to collaboration with Marxists and to a political regime in which
Christians and Marxists could work together permanently is worth noting.”9 This is relevant as
later they discuss how many of these grassroots organizers, once deeply involved in liberation
theological methods to resist the regime, felt excluded from the Church as it phased out social
and political organizing from its interests and structure. This, Fleet and Smith argue in
conjunction with this thesis, was the result of Church actions that had been brewing for a decade.
“Two additional developments worth noting in connection with the local Church were
carried out shortly after Msgr. Oviedo became archbishop of Santiago. The first was the
formal dissolution, in March 1990, of the Coordinating Council of Christian
Communities that brought together politically oriented Catholic activists during the years
of transition. The second was the dismantling of the Vicaria de Solidaridad, in November
1991. In both cases, conservative bishops succeeded in getting rid of organizations that
had troubled them in the past. Without having to call their activities or their political
impact into question, they could point to the availability of secular agencies or outlets
capable of carrying them on in the post military period. In doing so, they denied the
Catholic activists in these organizations at least some of the respectability that their
Church ties lent them.”10
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This quote acknowledges the inner workings and political decisions the Church made without the
consent of its members. By purposefully changing the way the Church functioned in order to
restore hierarchical structure, Church leaders effectively alienated the base which had so actively
participated during the regime. Diminished membership and deteriorating leadership were
perhaps not consequences which the Church had foreseen, but they were nevertheless the results
of cutting off the support and community organizing of the majority of its members.
In addition to the changing religious landscape, the Church had also given little protest to
Pinochet’s introduction of neoliberalism to the economy.11 The advent of democracy only
strengthened this economic framework, supported by the United States after the fall of the
USSR. This economy had, and continues to have, very little positive impact on the majority of
Chileans. Large swathes of low-income Chileans were targeted by the regime, and so turned to
the Church with their own progressive politics as a place of safety and resistance to oppression.
When capitalist policies were a part of Pinochet’s regime, they were also a part of what was
being resisted. However, when these policies were pulled through into the era of democracy, it
became much more difficult to resist what continued to be unjust economic frameworks. Many
were exhausted from nearly two decades of advocacy and protest, and with no institutional
support from the Church, it became an increasingly uphill battle. José Cademartori, the minister
of economics under the Allende administration, makes a study of the neoliberal structure of
Chile in the 1990’s, arguing against the view of the 90’s as some kind of “golden era” for
economics. He writes, “There has been a loss of confidence in the free market because the
benefits of ‘modernity’ have been concentrated in a small minority who enjoy First World
standards of living while the general population remains firmly ensconced in the Third World.”12
He notes that this model has left the majority of Chileans as “defenseless” and forced to
“sacrifice [them]selves for the sake of maintaining the system.”13 Fleet and Smith corroborate
this view, writing “Chile’s transition to democracy was not a categorical victory for the
opposition. Despite economic crisis, protests, and the development of a strong and increasingly
united opposition movement, Pinochet held out for his format and timetable, and made it difficult
for any government that followed him to break decisively with his economic policies.”14 Thus,
neoliberalism served the wealthy and excluded the rest, all while continuing to benefit the fading
power of Pinochet, who remained unaccountable for his crimes. It is relevant to note the impact
of negative economic policies as their capitalist tendencies were yet another force which pushed
out progressive political and religious thought. The Church failed to resist these policies as
Cardinal Fresno, Silva’s successor, denied any political or economic affiliation in favor of
centrist placation of the regime. In attempting to wash away the past and move peacefully into
Neoliberalism here refers to the ideology which relies on the free-market and “trickle-down” economics.
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the future, the Church fell short in truly reckoning with the oppression of not only the military
regime, but also the economic policies which it brought. It is worth mentioning that these
policies also benefited the Church, which would, over time, see their congregation change from
majority low income to majority wealthy. Further still, the normalization of neoliberal culture
would ensure the gradual death of Marxist thought and liberation theology. Without spending
money or putting in an excess of effort, the Church was able to sit back and let the democratic
transition shape society into a capitalist venture which benefited them greatly.
The result of this transition towards both neoliberal economics and conservative social
values, some would argue, was the decline of liberation theology in mainstream religious
discussion. Many academics have pondered the question of liberation theology in a modern age
and have struggled with the possibility of a religious movement independent of a Church. It is
clear that the institution has rejected this ideology, but there are many disenfranchised people
across Latin America that have deep spiritual passion, and that suffer greatly. According to
academics such as Judith Soares, this alone is enough to hold optimism for a revival of what
once was a cornerstone of Latin American Catholicism and grassroots organizing.15 However, in
Chile it is important to acknowledge the various barriers that have been put in place both by
politics and the Church in an attempt to steer away from leftist ideologies. The economic policies
are only a small piece of what became an active and direct attempt to exclude the values and
needs of large populations of religious members. Many of these historians and academics have
pointed to democracy as the advent of change in the Church, however this thesis argues that
democracy was a mere tool used by the Church in order to frame their changing value system as
progressive as opposed to regressive, which it certainly was. Pope John Paul II had an affinity to
the Church of the past, before the small allowances of Vatican II allowed for Marxist thought
and advocacy for the impoverished. The Vatican certainly supported a return to hierarchical
structures, especially in Chile, where grassroots activism and the Vicaria had placed much of the
agency in the hands of its members.
Thus, upon the eve of democratic transition, the Chilean Catholic Church adjusted its
narrative to fit its opportunity. They used the liberated government as a way to say goodbye to
any and all forms of oppression, and in doing so reasoned away the need for institutional support
systems like the Vicaria. By ignoring the continuation of unjust living conditions and rampant
poverty, and the disenfranchisement and continued missing status of the desaparecidos, the
Church had set itself up to lose a significant amount of its membership over the next three
decades. While Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno pushed for a Church that took a much more
centrist position against the government, democracy opened doors for a complete move away
from the fascist history of the regime. Instead of dealing with the decades of oppression and
persecution, they chose to turn towards a future with no reconciliation of the past. The Church
advocated for a peaceful transition into a “liberated” democratic society, while still publicly
expressing wariness in regard to democracy’s effect on social society. In addition to the
Judith Soares, “A Future for Liberation Theology?” in Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, no. 20:4 (2008),
480-486. Accessed June 04, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650802495080.
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continuing changes from outside the Church, leadership within also made a transition. Upon the
decision of the plebiscite, a conference was held in Punta de Tralca to bring together a
“‘majority’ of ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’” bishops. They met to decide how the national
Church would adjust to this inauguration of democracy, and also how to best encourage national
reconciliation of the crimes of the dictatorship.16 It was notable that three of the bishops missing
from the conference were well-known progressives, and furthermore the concluding decision
expressed a hope to rely on more “traditional church doctrine,” clearly an attempt to move away
from the leftist antics of their Latin American peers.17 This meeting signals the true mark of
transition. Cardinal Fresno’s power as the conservative archbishop of Santiago may have been
stifled by the international support of the Vicaria, but with the end of the dictatorship came the
opportunity to reframe the Church’s political position. With the introduction of democracy,
conservatives would argue, surely there was no longer a need for an organization which
documents human rights violations. They purposefully reframed the duties of the Vicaria, and
various other local organizing networks, in order to regain the hierarchical approach to power
they had held before Vatican II.
Perhaps one of the key strategies in this moment of transition was the reframing of
human rights as something entirely separate from political alignments. As a general concept, of
course advocacy for human rights is not a position which belongs to any singular political party.
However, the legacy of human rights in Chile, and more broadly in Latin America, was
consistently tied to a leftist struggle against right-wing authoritarian regimes.18 When Cardinal
Fresno took up the mantle of archbishop, he was clear to state “Don’t take me as a rightist or a
leftist, just take me as a pastor who is trying to stress the unity that the Lord asks of us.”19 Thus,
he made clear his position in favor of human rights, and yet also against the politics of liberation
theology. In doing so, he pulled the popularly received human rights advocacy of the Church
away from the leftist ideology of many of its lower ranking clergy and laity. Essentially making
it so his socially conservative views around society and the structural formation of the Church
could stay intact, whilst also not completely abandoning his parishioners to the brutality of the
regime; a political move which would have cause a great deal of international backlash. This
reframing of human rights advocacy from a radical fight to a keeping of the peace was carried on
by Cardinal Cavada in his public calls for forgiveness.
The era where progressive liberation theology shaped Catholic practice was quickly
drawing to a close, and Cardinal Fresno’s time would end even before the Vicaria, as he reached
the age limit of seventy-five in 1990 and handed in his resignation to Pope John Paul II. His
chosen successor was Carlos Oviedo Cavada, a conservative as well, though his character was
certainly much less vibrant. As the archbishop of Santiago in the time directly following a
Cristina D. Ferrer, “Bishops View Political Role of Church,” In Que Pasa. Dec 22, 1988.
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military regime, Cavada insisted on “a spirit of forgiveness and understanding.”20 Considering
the brutal torture many civilians underwent, as well as the loved ones who were disappeared, a
“spirit of forgiveness” was a relatively conservative stance to take against the war crimes of a
regime. Furthermore, this is all with the knowledge that Augusto Pinochet would not face human
rights abuse allegations, and instead would continue to serve as commander of the armed forces
until 1998. In this position, Pinochet would purposefully disrupt attempts at human rights trials
against those who had been involved with the regime, and he retained immunity until a fateful
trip to Europe in the late 90s, which put him in a precarious diplomatic position.21 Thus, even in
a democracy, the past trauma of human rights violations was discarded with little healing and no
retribution. Cardinal Cavada’s encouragement of forgiveness and understanding was, for many,
proof that the institution which had once heavily catalogued human rights abuses and their legal
ramifications no longer cared for the pursuit of such justice. Societal trauma following something
as intense as a seventeen-year regime no doubt presented many problems to larger Chilean
society, and yet the dismissal of it by the Church showed a significant lack of urgency and
community-based networking that had once made it a sanctuary to many.

Despite efforts to erase the past, echoes of the
regime remain. This image was taken in the Londres
neighborhood of Santiago, where there was an
infamous detention center. On the street there are
plaques which give the names, ages, and affiliations
of all disappeared there. The paint on the door
reads “Here [there is] torture.”

However, despite Fresno and other leaders’ best efforts to reconcile Church participation
with conservative hierarchical views, Catholic membership was already beginning to decline by
1990. As previously referenced, the closing of the Vicaria in 1992 provides an example of the
extent to which the Church was willing to go to close down community based religious
organizations. The dissolution of the Vicaria can be seen as a landmark for the political transition
of the Church. An organization which had provided sanctuary and legal representation for those
suffering under the regime, as well as catalogued and published human rights violations of the
“Pinochet Reacts to Contreras Court Ruling,” In El Mercurio. Jun 5, 1995.
“Europe | Pinochet Arrested in London,” BBC News. BBC, October 17, 1998.
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government, was suddenly deemed useless in a new democratic era. According to the Church, in
its now changing conservative leadership, the duties of the Vicaria were transferred to that of the
Social Pastorate, a new office that put the Vicaria’s responsibilities exclusively into the hands of
the clergy. This new office was inaugurated by known conservative forces in the Church, most
notably Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno who had previously relinquished his position as
Archbishop of Santiago to Carlos Oviedo Cavada, the man who presented the Pastorate to the
audience.22 The facade of the Pastorate was briefly lived, a feeble attempt to not make the
transition so abrupt. It is widely acknowledged today that the legacy of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad is carried on through its continued archives, the Documentation and Archive
Foundation of the Vicaria de Solidaridad located in a tangential neighborhood of Santiago.23 In
fact, besides the news articles reporting on the inauguration ceremony, there is little to no
information available on the Social Pastorate. Most likely relegated to being a side project of
already busy clergy, the Pastorate quickly faded out of the Church’s main frame.
The Vicaria’s end was a blow to impoverished and struggling communities across
Santiago, but it was certainly not the only factor of this political transition. When Fresno took
office in the 1980s, he stayed fairly distant from the Vicaria itself, as well as other activist
groups, and was publicly vocal concerning his socially conservative views. This was a sign for
many that the Church was quickly becoming closed to the members who had made up its base
structure. Father Francisco Sampedro of the Catholic Church in Santiago spoke of this
development in a news publication, stating “some sectors of the hierarchy do not appreciate the
lay person….”24 This same article pays close attention to the rise of Evangelicalism, specifically
the Pentecostal church, which provides specific roles to members seeking to engage with
community activism. According to the author, “As a result of this activism, which makes them
channel most of their energy towards spiritual betterment, they becomes more responsible and
then they feel more valued by society.”25 The same sense of reasoning can be seen with the
actions of comunidades de base—the base communities for local churches which engage in
spiritual and communal organizing, vigils, support, and resistance.26 These comunidades de base
are few and far between today, but during the time directly before and during the dictatorship
they made up much of the Catholic communities, and undoubtedly provided this sense of
responsibility and value the article underlines. Comunidades de base consisted of neighbors and
families who took action in their own barrios for the protection of their own children, the return
of desaparecidos, security against other militant groups and criminal issues, and the overall
amelioration of their community. When churches needed organizing for holidays, volunteers for
roles such as legal or medical aid, spreading of human rights pamphlets, and the gathering of
Jose Gonzalez, “Vicariate Renamed, To Continue Social Work,” La Nacion, May 12, 1993.
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information, the comunidades de base were the on the frontlines. Once the agency of
volunteering and organizing for a cause which benefited their communities was taken from them,
many turned away from the Church. It was not such a direct hit that the Church attendance
immediately plummeted, but over the course of the 1990’s it would become clear to many that
the Church had much different goals and motivations than it had ten years before. Without that
feeling of community and value present, the appeal of regimented Church practices and politics
faded for many Chileans.
Many studies have confirmed this downward trend. In a sociological survey conducted by
Matías Andrés Bargsted and Nicolás De la Cerda, they use political alignment, religious
affiliation, and church attendance as a means through which to measure the trends of political dealignment experienced in Chile in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The research shows
a sustained decline in the Chilean Catholic population, specifically those that attend mass
regularly.27 Another interesting take away from the survey and accompanying analysis is the
downward trend for right-wing Catholics. At first glance, this finding is in tension with an
argument for a rise in Catholic conservatism, but the survey itself does not separate its findings
between Church attending and non-Church attending Catholics, nor does it account for the
general decrease in the population of Chilean Catholics specifically. Thus, this decrease can be
accounted for in the makeup of mass itself, as the changing dynamics of the Church in the 90’s
allowed for much more conservative homilies focused on social morals.28 Therefore, it is still fair
to assume those who actually attend the mass will likely be of a more conservative variety.
Another finding in this research which underlines the centrality of the Catholic Church
specifically, is that the same trends of decrease are not found in the Evangelical community.29 In
fact, as the previous news article mentioned, there has been a continual rise in the Evangelical
community in Chile, and more broadly in Latin America. In the context of this discussion, this is
likely due to the fact that Catholics and Evangelicals do not have the same leadership nor the
same history in the nation of Chile; the guidance of Catholic Church leaders has then found their
Church in a very different situation in the twenty-first century.
Another set of research which documents this decrease in the importance of Catholic life
in Chile is a survey conducted by the World Values Survey. WVS is a network of social
scientists attempting to document changing values within communities, and how those values
impact social lives and perspectives. Their surveys ask questions which range from opinions on
social morals and family life, to involvement in political organizations. In order to track the
value which participants place on various sectors of their life, the surveys functions which a
numerical system; participants use 1 to indicate Very Important, 2 as Rather Important, 3 as Not
Very Important, and 4 as Not At All Important. In the questionnaire from 1990, a large majority
Matías Andrés Bargsted and Nicolás De la Cerda, “Ideological Preferences and Evolution of the Religious
Cleavage in Chile, 1998–2014,” Latin American Research Review 54, no. 2 (June 25, 2019).
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of participants individually ranked belonging to a human rights group, belonging to a religious
organization, doing unpaid volunteer work for a religious group, and doing unpaid volunteer
work for a human rights group as either 1 or 2 in the set of importance. By the time of the next
questionnaire, in 1996, answers changed drastically. While a large majority still answered that
they were religious, there was a striking decrease in the value with which they placed active
membership to a voluntary religious organization, now marked at an indifferent 3. This change is
only further substantiated by the questionnaire from 2000, which shows a much more diverse set
of responses when participants were asked how often they attend Church.30 In a country once
highly religious, many across the board responded by saying they attended only once a month,
and certainly less than they used to. The downward trajectory exemplified by the World Value
Survey questionnaire continues to support the claim that spiritually and emotionally, Chileans
feel more and more removed from their religious life.

Photo taken at the entrance of the Vicaria de
Solidaridad. Military police hose down civilians
attempting to enter the Vicaria. Circa 1980.

Photo taken at the entrance of what is today the
offices of the Archdiocese. There is a plaque on the
wall that pays tribute to the Vicaria, and where the
fire truck once was stands a statue of Cardinal Silva .
2019.

We are attempting to understand the motivations the Catholic Church had in Chile to
transition political alignments, especially when the result of such an action would directly lead to
a decrease in Church membership and participation. Various authors have argued for
democracy’s power in such a moment and have pointed to political change as a catalyst for
religious change.31 However, this thesis argues that the transition to democracy was instead used
as a tool through which the Church was able to complete their return to hierarchical power
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structures and conservative social morals. The question of why they would go through with such
an abrupt change can be traced back to power; John Paul II’s stricter Vatican and Cardinal
Fresno’s placation of the regime all point towards a desire within the leadership of the Catholic
Church to return to a time before Marxist meddling and the introduction of liberation theology.
This desire was balanced on the misreading of liberation theology, and its influences such as
grassroots organizing and the Vicaria de Solidaridad, as a threat to the control of the Church.
Instead of acknowledging the vast participation and active membership of the Chilean
population, especially in Santiago, the Church felt it did not exercise enough control over the
social and cultural aspects of citizen life. Furthermore, they underestimated low-income
Chileans’ belief in resistant institutions such as the Vicaria, and their continued abuse by the
economic systems of neoliberal democracy. The Church put its faith in democratic promises of
liberation and excess, and continued to harbor negative sentiments towards the ideologies of
Marxism which advocated for the dissolution of religious institutions. It is likely that they did
not realize the consequence of changing political alignments and religious routine would have
such a negative impact on Catholic Church attendance and the popularity of spiritual life. There
are many remaining questions which inquire too deep for us to speculate, such as why these
consequences were unforeseen, and how removed the clerical bodies were from impoverished
living. However, it is true that many priests and clergy in impoverished areas remained dedicated
to their communities in spite of the directions of the larger national church. A prime example
would be Padre Mariano Puga, who continued for decades after the regime to promote liberation
theology and advocacy for the poor. Still, it was difficult to live or organize in a certain way so
unsupported by the institution one belongs to, and thus many of these communities continue to
fade out of history. The eventual move into the Concertacion government at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, would turn eyes towards larger national problems, and time would take its
toll on the many poor, religious communities of Santiago.32
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